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Exploring the Obstacles to Implementing Economic Mechanisms to Stimulate Antibiotic Research and Development: A Multi-Actor and System-Level Analysis.

Am J Law Med

May 2016

Enrico Baraldi, Francesco Ciabuschi, and Alexandra Waluszewski are from Uppsala University, Sweden; Ross Leach is from the Infection Control Program, University of Geneva Hospitals & Faculty of Medicine, Geneva, Switzerland; and Chantal Morel is from the Infection Control Program, University of Geneva Hospitals & Faculty of Medicine, Geneva, Switzerland, and the London School of Economics and Political Science, United Kingdom.

This Article examines the potential stakeholder-related obstacles hindering the implementation of mechanisms to re-ignite the development of novel antibiotics. Proposed economic models and incentives to drive such development include: Public Funding of Research and Development ("R&D"), Tax Incentives, Milestone Prizes, End Payments, Intellectual Property ("IP") and Exclusivity Extensions, Pricing and Reimbursement Incentives, Product Development Partnerships ("PDPs"), and the Options Market for Antibiotics model. Drawing on personal experience and understanding of the antibiotic field, as well as stakeholder consultation and numerous expert meetings within the DRIVE-AB project and Uppsala Health Summit 2015, the Authors identify obstacles attributable to the following actors: Universities and Research Institutes, Small and Medium-sized Enterprises ("SMEs"), Large Pharmaceutical Companies, Marketing Approval Regulators, Payors, Healthcare Providers, National Healthcare Authorities, Patients, and Supranational Institutions.

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