The case for neurons: a no-go theorem for consciousness on a chip.

We apply the methodology of no-go theorems as developed in physics to the question of artificial consciousness. The result is a no-go theorem which shows that under a general assumption, called dynamical relevance, Artificial Intelligence (AI) systems that run on contemporary computer chips cannot be conscious. Consciousness is dynamically relevant, simply put, if, according to a theory of consciousness, it is relevant for the temporal evolution of a system's states.

The quantum gravity seeds for laws of nature.

We discuss the challenges that the standard (Humean and non-Humean) accounts of laws face within the framework of quantum gravity where space and time may not be fundamental. This paper identifies core (meta)physical features that cut across a number of quantum gravity approaches and formalisms and that provide seeds for articulating updated conceptions that could account for QG laws not involving any spatio-temporal notions. To this aim, we will in particular highlight the constitutive roles of quantum entanglement, quantum transition amplitudes and quantum causal histories.

When New Experience Leads to New Knowledge: A Computational Framework for Formalizing Epistemically Transformative Experiences.

The discovery of a new kind of experience can teach an agent what that kind of experience is like. Such a discovery can be epistemically transformative, teaching an agent something they could not have learned without having that kind of experience. However, learning something new does not always require new experience.

Ability and knowledge: from epistemic transition systems to labelled stit models.

It is possible to know that one can guarantee a certain result and yet not know how to guarantee it. In such cases one has the ability to guarantee something in a causal sense, but not in an epistemic sense. In this paper we focus on two formalisms used to model both conceptions of ability: one formalism based on epistemic transition systems and the other on labelled stit models.

What is the IPCC's assessment style and what shaped it?

The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) is one of the best-known global expert organizations. Its main objective is to supply policymakers with policy-relevant recent scientific information about climate change. The way in which the IPCC is obtaining this information is called an assessment.

From task structures to world models: what do LLMs know?

In what sense does a large language model (LLM) have knowledge? We answer by granting LLMs 'instrumental knowledge': knowledge gained by using next-word generation as an instrument. We then ask how instrumental knowledge is related to the ordinary, 'worldly knowledge' exhibited by humans, and explore this question in terms of the degree to which instrumental knowledge can be said to incorporate the structured world models of cognitive science. We discuss ways LLMs could recover degrees of worldly knowledge and suggest that such recovery will be governed by an implicit, resource-rational tradeoff between world models and tasks.

Towards a structural turn in consciousness science.

Recent activities in virtually all fields engaged in consciousness studies indicate early signs of a structural turn, where verbal descriptions or simple formalisations of conscious experiences are replaced by structural tools, most notably mathematical spaces. My goal here is to offer three comments that, in my opinion, are essential to avoid misunderstandings in these developments early on. These comments concern metaphysical premises of structural approaches, the viability of structure-preserving mappings, and the question of what a structure of conscious experience is in the first place.

Confirmation by Robustness Analysis: A Bayesian Account.

Some authors claim that minimal models have limited epistemic value (Fumagalli, 2016; Grüne-Yanoff, 2009a). Others defend the epistemic benefits of modelling by invoking the role of robustness analysis for hypothesis confirmation (see, e.g.

When remediating one artifact results in another: control, confounders, and correction.

Scientists aim to remediate artifacts in their experimental datasets. However, the remediation of one artifact can result in another. Why might this happen, and what does this consequence tell us about how we should account for artifacts and their control? In this paper, I explore a case in functional neuroimaging where remediation appears to have caused this problem.

Reply to Rourk, C. Comment on "Albantakis et al. Computing the Integrated Information of a Quantum Mechanism. 2023, , 449".

In response to a comment by Chris Rourk on our article , we briefly (1) consider the role of potential hybrid/classical mechanisms from the perspective of integrated information theory (IIT), (2) discuss whether the (Q)IIT formalism needs to be extended to capture the hypothesized hybrid mechanism, and (3) clarify our motivation for developing a QIIT formalism and its scope of applicability.

The Measurement Problem Is a Feature, Not a Bug-Schematising the Observer and the Concept of an Open System on an Informational, or (Neo-)Bohrian, Approach.

I flesh out the sense in which the informational approach to interpreting quantum mechanics, as defended by Pitowsky and Bub and lately by a number of other authors, is (neo-)Bohrian. I argue that on this approach, quantum mechanics represents what Bohr called a "natural generalisation of the ordinary causal description" in the sense that the idea (which philosophers of science like Stein have argued for on the grounds of practical and epistemic necessity) that understanding a theory as a theory of physics requires that one be able to "schematise the observer" within it is elevated in quantum mechanics to the level of a postulate in the sense that interpreting the outcome of a measurement interaction, as providing us with information about the world, requires as a matter of principle, the specification of a schematic representation of an observer in the form of a 'Boolean frame'-the Boolean algebra representing the yes-or-no questions associated with a given observable representative of a given experimental context. I argue that the approach's central concern is with the methodological question of how to assign physical properties to what one takes to be a system in a given experimental context, rather than the metaphysical question of what a given state vector represents independently of any context, and I show how the quantum generalisation of the concept of an open system may be used to assuage Einstein's complaint that the orthodox approach to quantum mechanics runs afoul of the supposedly fundamental methodological requirement to the effect that one must always be able, according to Einstein, to treat spatially separated systems as isolated from one another.

On the non-uniqueness problem in integrated information theory.

Integrated Information Theory (IIT) 3.0 is among the leading theories of consciousness in contemporary neuroscience. The core of the theory relies on the calculation of a scalar mathematical measure of consciousness, Φ, which is inspired by the phenomenological axioms of the theory.

Mechanical Choices: A Compatibilist Libertarian Response.

Michael S. Moore defends the ideas of free will and responsibility, especially in relation to criminal law, against several challenges from neuroscience. I agree with Moore that morality and the law presuppose a commonsense understanding of humans as rational agents, who make choices and act for reasons, and that to defend moral and legal responsibility, we must show that this commonsense understanding remains viable.

Computing the Integrated Information of a Quantum Mechanism.

Originally conceived as a theory of consciousness, integrated information theory (IIT) provides a theoretical framework intended to characterize the compositional causal information that a system, in its current state, specifies about itself. However, it remains to be determined whether IIT as a theory of consciousness is compatible with quantum mechanics as a theory of microphysics. Here, we present an extension of IIT's latest formalism to evaluate the mechanism integrated information (φ) of a system subset to discrete, finite-dimensional quantum systems (e.

Fusions of Consciousness.

What are conscious experiences? Can they combine to form new experiences? What are conscious subjects? Can they combine to form new subjects? Most attempts to answer these questions assume that spacetime, and some of its particles, are fundamental. However, physicists tell us that spacetime cannot be fundamental. Spacetime, they say, is doomed.

Health, consciousness, and the evolution of subjects.

The goal of this programmatic paper is to highlight a close connection between the core problem in the philosophy of medicine, i.e. the concept of health, and the core problem of the philosophy of mind, i.

The Emperor Is Naked: Replies to commentaries on the target article.

The 35 commentaries cover a wide range of topics and take many different stances on the issues explored by the target article. We have organised our response to the commentaries around three central questions: Are Friston blankets just Pearl blankets? What ontological and metaphysical commitments are implied by the use of Friston blankets? What kind of explanatory work are Friston blankets capable of? We conclude our reply with a short critical reflection on the indiscriminate use of both Markov blankets and the free energy principle.

Diffusion of punishment in collective norm violations.

People assign less punishment to individuals who inflict harm collectively, compared to those who do so alone. We show that this arises from judgments of diminished individual causal responsibility in the collective cases. In Experiment 1, participants (N = 1002) assigned less punishment to individuals involved in collective actions leading to intentional and accidental deaths, but not failed attempts, emphasizing that harmful outcomes, but not malicious intentions, were necessary and sufficient for the diffusion of punishment.

When should researchers cite study differences in response to a failure to replicate?

Scientists often respond to failures to replicate by citing differences between the experimental components of an original study and those of its attempted replication. In this paper, we investigate these purported . We assess a body of failures to replicate in neuroscience studies on spinal cord injury.

The Prospects for a Monist Theory of Non-causal Explanation in Science and Mathematics.

We explore the prospects of a monist account of explanation for both non-causal explanations in science and pure mathematics. Our starting point is the counterfactual theory of explanation (CTE) for explanations in science, as advocated in the recent literature on explanation. We argue that, despite the obvious differences between mathematical and scientific explanation, the CTE can be extended to cover both non-causal explanations in science and mathematical explanations.

E-synthesis for carcinogenicity assessments: A case study of processed meat.

Rationale, Aims And Objectives: Recent controversies about dietary advice concerning meat demonstrate that aggregating the available evidence to assess a putative causal link between food and cancer is a challenging enterprise.

Methods: We show how a tool developed for assessing putative causal links between drugs and adverse drug reactions, E-Synthesis, can be applied for food carcinogenicity assessments. The application is demonstrated on the putative causal relationship between processed meat consumption and cancer.