Multiple Imputation of Missing Complex Survey Data using SAS: A Brief Overview and An Example Based on the Research and Development Survey (RANDS).

Multiple imputation (MI) is a widely used analytic approach to address missing data problems. SAS (SAS Institute Inc, Cary, N.C.

Collaboration between public health and law enforcement: new paradigms and partnerships for bioterrorism planning and response.

The biological attacks with powders containing Bacillus anthracis sent through the mail during September and October 2001 led to unprecedented public health and law enforcement investigations, which involved thousands of investigators from federal, state, and local agencies. Following recognition of the first cases of anthrax in Florida in early October 2001, investigators from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) were mobilized to assist investigators from state and local public health and law enforcement agencies. Although public health and criminal investigations have been conducted in concert in the past, the response to the anthrax attacks required close collaboration because of the immediate and ongoing threat to public safety.

Surface sampling methods for Bacillus anthracis spore contamination.

During an investigation conducted December 17-20, 2001, we collected environmental samples from a U.S. postal facility in Washington, D.

Adherence to antimicrobial inhalational anthrax prophylaxis among postal workers, Washington, D.C., 2001.

In October 2001, two envelopes containing Bacillus anthracis spores were processed at the Washington, D.C., Processing and Distribution Center of the U.

Anthrax postexposure prophylaxis in postal workers, Connecticut, 2001.

After inhalational anthrax was diagnosed in a Connecticut woman on November 20, 2001, postexposure prophylaxis was recommended for postal workers at the regional mail facility serving the patient's area. Although environmental testing at the facility yielded negative results, subsequent testing confirmed the presence of Bacillus anthracis. We distributed questionnaires to 100 randomly selected postal workers within 20 days of initial prophylaxis.

Antimicrobial postexposure prophylaxis for anthrax: adverse events and adherence.

We collected data during postexposure antimicrobial prophylaxis campaigns and from a prophylaxis program evaluation 60 days after start of antimicrobial prophylaxis involving persons from six U.S. sites where Bacillus anthracis exposures occurred.

Sequencing of 16S rRNA gene: a rapid tool for identification of Bacillus anthracis.

In a bioterrorism event, a tool is needed to rapidly differentiate Bacillus anthracis from other closely related spore-forming Bacillus species. During the recent outbreak of bioterrorism-associated anthrax, we sequenced the 16S rRNA generom these species to evaluate the potential of 16S rRNA gene sequencing as a diagnostic tool. We found eight distinct 16S types among all 107 16S rRNA gene seqs fuences that differed from each other at 1 to 8 positions (0.

Molecular subtyping of Bacillus anthracis and the 2001 bioterrorism-associated anthrax outbreak, United States.

Molecular subtyping of Bacillus anthracis played an important role in differentiating and identifying strains during the 2001 bioterrorism-associated outbreak. Because B. anthracis has a low level of genetic variability, only a few subtyping methods, with varying reliability, exist.

Specific, sensitive, and quantitative enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay for human immunoglobulin G antibodies to anthrax toxin protective antigen.

The bioterrorism-associated human anthrax epidemic in the fall of 2001 highlighted the need for a sensitive, reproducible, and specific laboratory test for the confirmatory diagnosis of human anthrax. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention developed, optimized, and rapidly qualified an enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay (ELISA) for immunoglobulin G (IgG) antibodies to Bacillus anthracis protective antigen (PA) in human serum. The qualified ELISA had a minimum detection limit of 0.

Call-tracking data and the public health response to bioterrorism-related anthrax.

After public notification of confirmed cases of bioterrorism-related anthrax, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention's Emergency Operations Center responded to 11,063 bioterrorism-related telephone calls from October 8 to November 11, 2001. Most calls were inquiries from the public about anthrax vaccines (58.4%), requests for general information on bioterrorism prevention (14.

Environmental sampling for spores of Bacillus anthracis.

On November 11, 2001, following the bioterrorism-related anthrax attacks, the U.S. Postal Service collected samples at the Southern Connecticut Processing and Distribution Center; all samples were negative for Bacillus anthracis.

Bioterrorism-related anthrax surveillance, Connecticut, September-December, 2001.

On November 19, 2001, a case of inhalational anthrax was identified in a 94-year-old Connecticut woman, who later died. We conducted intensive surveillance for additional anthrax cases, which included collecting data from hospitals, emergency departments, private practitioners, death certificates, postal facilities, veterinarians, and the state medical examiner. No additional cases of anthrax were identified.

Surveillance for anthrax cases associated with contaminated letters, New Jersey, Delaware, and Pennsylvania, 2001.

In October 2001, two inhalational anthrax and four cutaneous anthrax cases, resulting from the processing of Bacillus anthracis-containing envelopes at a New Jersey mail facility, were identified. Subsequently, we initiated stimulated passive hospital-based and enhanced passive surveillance for anthrax-compatible syndromes. From October 24 to December 17, 2001, hospitals reported 240,160 visits and 7,109 intensive-care unit admissions in the surveillance area (population 6.

Inhalational anthrax outbreak among postal workers, Washington, D.C., 2001.

In October 2001, four cases of inhalational anthrax occurred in workers in a Washington, D.C., mail facility that processed envelopes containing Bacillus anthracis spores.

A two-component direct fluorescent-antibody assay for rapid identification of Bacillus anthracis.

A two-component direct fluorescent-antibody (DFA) assay, using fluorescein-labeled monoclonal antibodies specific to the Bacillus anthracis cell wall (CW-DFA) and capsule (CAP-DFA) antigens, was evaluated and validated for rapid identification of B. anthracis. We analyzed 230 B.

Bioterrorism-related anthrax: international response by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.

After reports of the intentional release of Bacillus anthracis in the United States, epidemiologists, laboratorians, and clinicians around the world were called upon to respond to widespread political and public concerns. To respond to inquiries from other countries regarding anthrax and bioterrorism, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention established an international team in its Emergency Operations Center. From October 12, 2001, to January 2, 2002, this team received 130 requests from 70 countries and 2 territories.

Epidemiologic investigations of bioterrorism-related anthrax, New Jersey, 2001.

At least four Bacillus anthracis-containing envelopes destined for New York City and Washington, D.C. were processed at the Trenton Processing and Distribution Center (PDC) on September 18 and October 9, 2001.