Pragmatic realism: towards a reconciliation of enactivism and realism.

This paper addresses some apparent philosophical tensions between realism and enactivism by means of Charles Peirce's pragmatism. Enactivism's Mind-Life Continuity thesis has been taken to commit it to some form of anti-realist 'world-construction' which has been considered controversial. Accordingly, a new realist enactivism is proposed by Zahidi ( (3), 461-475, 2014), drawing on Ian Hacking's 'entity realism', which places subjects in worlds comprised of the things that they can successfully manipulate. We review this attempt, and argue that whilst Zahidi rightly urges enactivists towards 'internal realism', he cannot sustain a non-negotiable aspect of realism that is crucial for scientific progress - the claim that multiple subjects inhabit . We explore Peirce's pragmatism as an alternative solution, foregrounding his distinction between existence and reality, and his inquiry-based account of cognition. These theoretical innovations, we argue, fruitfully generalize Zahidi's enactivist realism to a richer, enactivist realism. We explore how this realism's pan-species monism about truth encourages and supports the investigation of non-human animal cognition, and conclude by considering some implications of our discussion for long-standing realism debates within pragmatism.