AI Article Synopsis
- Social networks often feature unidirectional interactions, which differ from the commonly studied undirected ones, leading to a unique voter model in a dynamic directed network.
- The study reveals that evolving networks’ degree distribution can be analytically obtained, and highlights that average degree and opinion outcomes are governed by different emergent games.
- The research identifies conditions under which a minority opinion can dominate the larger group, enhancing our understanding of how opinions spread in social networks.
Article Abstract
Unidirectional social interactions are ubiquitous in real social networks whereas undirected interactions are intensively studied. We establish a voter model in a dynamical directed network. We analytically obtain the degree distribution of the evolving network at any given time. Furthermore, we find that the average degree is captured by an emergent game. However, we find that the fate of opinions is captured by another emergent game. Beyond expectation, the two emergent games are typically different due to the unidirectionality of the evolving networks. The Nash equilibrium analysis of the two games facilitates us to give the criterion under which the minority opinion with few disciples initially takes over the population eventually for in-group bias. Our work fosters the understanding of opinion dynamics ranging from methodology to research content.
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| http://dx.doi.org/10.1103/PhysRevE.109.L062301 | DOI Listing |
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