Biological market theory can be used to explain intraspecific cooperation, interspecific mutualism, and sexual selection through models of game theory. These models describe the interactions between organisms as two classes of traders (buyers/sellers) exchanging commodities in the form of goods (e.g. food, shelter, matings) and services (e.g. warning calls, protection). Here, we expand biological market theory to include auction theory where bidding serves to match buyers and sellers. In a reverse auction, the seller increases the value of the item or decreases the cost until a buyer steps forward. We provide several examples of ecological systems that may have reverse auctions as underlying mechanisms to form mutualistic relationships. We focus on the yellow baboon (Papio cynocephalus) mating system as a case study to propose how the mechanisms of a reverse auction, which have the unintended but emergent consequence of producing a mutually beneficial outcome that improves collective reproductive benefits of the troop in this multi-female multi-male polygynandrous social system. For the yellow baboon, we posit that the "seller" is the reproductively cycling female, and the "buyer" is a male looking to mate with a cycling female. To the male, the "item for the sale" is the opportunity to sire an offspring, the price is providing safety and foraging time (via consortship) to the female. The "increasing value of the item for sale" is the chance of conception, which increases with each cycle since a female has resumed cycling post-partum. The female's sexual swelling is an honest indicator of that cycle's probability of conception, and since resident males can track a female's cycle since resumption, there is transparency. The males presumably know the chance of conception when choosing to bid by offering consortship. Across nature, this reverse auction game likely exists in other inter- and intraspecific social relationships. Considering an ecological system as a reverse auction broadens our view of social evolution and adaptations through the lens of human economic structures.
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http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1365-2656.14085 | DOI Listing |
Sensors (Basel)
November 2024
Department of Computer Science, Florida Polytechnic University, Lakeland, FL 33805, USA.
In this paper, we investigate whether greedy algorithms, traditionally used for pedestrian-based crowdsensing, remain effective in the context of vehicular crowdsensing (VCS). Vehicular crowdsensing leverages vehicles equipped with sensors to gather and transmit data to address several urban challenges. Despite its potential, VCS faces issues with user engagement due to inadequate incentives and privacy concerns.
View Article and Find Full Text PDFJ Anim Ecol
July 2024
Department of Biological Sciences, University of Illinois at Chicago, Chicago, Illinois, USA.
Biological market theory can be used to explain intraspecific cooperation, interspecific mutualism, and sexual selection through models of game theory. These models describe the interactions between organisms as two classes of traders (buyers/sellers) exchanging commodities in the form of goods (e.g.
View Article and Find Full Text PDFHeliyon
October 2023
Department of Physics, College of Science, King Khalid University, Saudi Arabia.
Trading companies of used product market are struggling to gain customers attentaion and to sell the products. The aim of this research is to develop a mechanism that can maximize the sale of products while considering profit implications. The literature review classifies the procurement mechanism.
View Article and Find Full Text PDFJ Health Econ
September 2023
Coalition for Epidemic Preparedness Innovations, Oslo, Norway. Electronic address:
We derive the optimal funding mechanism to incentivize development and production of vaccines against diseases with epidemic potential. In the model, suppliers' costs are private information and investments are noncontractible, precluding cost-reimbursement contracts, requiring fixed-price contracts conditioned on delivery of a successful product. The high failure risk for individual vaccines calls for incentivizing multiple entrants, accomplished by the optimal mechanism, a (w+1)-price reverse Vickrey auction with reserve, where w is the number of selected entrants.
View Article and Find Full Text PDFThe recruitment of trustworthy and high-quality workers is an important research issue for MCS. Previous studies either assume that the qualities of workers are known in advance, or assume that the platform knows the qualities of workers once it receives their collected data. In reality, to reduce costs and thus maximize revenue, many strategic workers do not perform their sensing tasks honestly and report fake data to the platform, which is called False data attacks.
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