We generalize the Bush-Mosteller learning, the Roth-Erev learning, and the social learning to include mistakes, such that the nonlinear replicator-mutator equation with either additive or multiplicative mutation is generated in an asymptotic limit. Subsequently, we exhaustively investigate the ubiquitous rock-paper-scissors game for some analytically tractable motifs of mutation pattern for which the replicator-mutator flow is seen to exhibit rich dynamics that include limit cycles and chaotic orbits. The main result of this paper is that in both symmetric and asymmetric game interactions, mistakes can sometimes help the players learn; in fact, mistakes can even control chaos to lead to rational Nash-equilibrium outcomes. Furthermore, we report a hitherto-unknown Hamiltonian structure of the replicator-mutator equation.
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| http://dx.doi.org/10.1103/PhysRevE.109.034404 | DOI Listing |
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