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http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s44250-022-00007-5 | DOI Listing |
Math Biosci Eng
November 2024
Instituto de Física de São Carlos, Universidade de São Paulo, Caixa Postal 369, São Carlos 13560-970, SP, Brazil.
In deciding whether to contribute to a public good, people often face a social dilemma known as the tragedy of the commons: either bear the cost of promoting the collective welfare, or free-ride on the efforts of others. Here, we study the dynamics of cooperation in the context of the threshold public goods games, in which groups must reach a cumulative target contribution to prevent a potential disaster, such as an environmental crisis or social unrest, that could result in the loss of all private wealth. The catch is that the crisis may never materialize, and the investment in the public good is lost.
View Article and Find Full Text PDFEntropy (Basel)
November 2024
School of Mathematics and Sciences, Suqian University, Suqian 223800, China.
Uncertainty, time delays, and jumps often coexist in dynamic game problems due to the complexity of the environment. To address such issues, we can utilize uncertain delay differential equations with jumps to depict the dynamic changes in differential game problems that involve uncertain noise, delays, and jumps. In this paper, we first examine a linear quadratic differential game optimistic value problem within an uncertain environment characterized by jumps and delays.
View Article and Find Full Text PDFJ R Soc Interface
October 2024
School of Data Science and Society, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, Chapel Hill, NC 27599, USA.
When individuals interact in groups, the evolution of cooperation is traditionally modelled using the framework of public goods games. These models often assume that the return of the public goods depends linearly on the fraction of contributors. In contrast, in real-life public goods interactions, the return can depend on the size of the investor pool as well.
View Article and Find Full Text PDFAnesth Analg
October 2024
Nuffield Department of Anaesthetics, Oxford University Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust, Oxford, UK.
Phys Rev E
September 2024
Interdisciplinary Graduate School of Engineering Sciences, Kyushu University, Fukuoka 816-8580, Japan.
Destructive agents, who opt out of the game and indiscriminately harm others, paradoxically foster cooperation, representing an intriguing variant of the voluntary participation strategy. Yet, their impact on cooperation remains inadequately understood, particularly in the context of pairwise social dilemma games and in comparison to their counterparts, constructive agents, who opt out of the game but indiscriminately benefit others. Furthermore, little is known about the combined effects of both agent types on cooperation dynamics.
View Article and Find Full Text PDFEnter search terms and have AI summaries delivered each week - change queries or unsubscribe any time!