De Neys makes a compelling case that the sacrificial moral dilemmas do not elicit competing "fast and slow" processes. But are there even two processes? Or just two intuitions? There remains strong evidence, most notably from lesion studies, that sacrificial dilemmas engage distinct cognitive processes generating conflicting emotional and rational responses. The dual-process theory gets much right, but needs revision.
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http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X22003193 | DOI Listing |
Does the amount of perceived moral responsibility correspond to the magnitude of the act to the same degree regardless of whether the act is moral or immoral? In four experiments (N = 1617; all preregistered), we found that-when evaluating two agents who performed similar acts but with different magnitude-observers judged greater differences in their moral responsibility when those acts were moral than when they were immoral. That is, the same difference in magnitude had greater influence on perceived moral responsibility for moral acts compared to immoral acts. Furthermore, we also found that the asymmetry effect impacted perceivers' judgment of the moral character of the agent (Studies 2 and 3).
View Article and Find Full Text PDFExp Psychol
July 2024
CLLE, Université Toulouse Jean Jaurès & CNRS, Toulouse, France.
Recent work has supported the role of reasoning in third-party moral judgment of harm transgressions. In particular, reasoning may increase the weight of intention in moral judgment, especially following accidental harm, a situation that presumably requires judges to balance considerations about the outcome endured by a victim on the one hand and considerations about an agent's intention to cause harm on the other hand. Three preregistered lab-based studies aimed to test the causal contribution of reasoning to moral judgment of harm transgressions using experimental manipulations borrowed from the reasoning literature: time pressure (Experiment 1), cognitive load (Experiment 2), and priming (Experiment 3).
View Article and Find Full Text PDFAutistic people often experience challenges in social contexts, and when decisions need to be made quickly. There is evidence showing that autistic people have a tendency for greater deliberation and lower intuition, compared to non-autistic people. This has led to the researchers' proposal that autism is associated with an enhanced level of rationality.
View Article and Find Full Text PDFCognition
September 2024
University of Alberta, Canada.
Front Psychol
May 2024
Ethics Institute, Department of Philosophy and Religious Studies, Utrecht University, Utrecht, Netherlands.
Greene's influential dual-process model of moral cognition (mDPM) proposes that when people engage in Type 2 processing, they tend to make consequentialist moral judgments. One important source of empirical support for this claim comes from studies that ask participants to make moral judgments while experimentally manipulating Type 2 processing. This paper presents a meta-analysis of the published psychological literature on the effect of four standard cognitive-processing manipulations (cognitive load; ego depletion; induction; time restriction) on moral judgments about sacrificial moral dilemmas [ = 44; = 68; total = 14, 003; () = 194.
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