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It's the Wrong Virus: Rapid Adaptation of Operations Inside a Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza Select Agent Laboratory in Response to the 2019 SARS-CoV-2 Pandemic. | LitMetric

Background: The Animal Biosafety Level 3 Enhanced (ABSL-3+) laboratory at St. Jude Children's Research Hospital has a long history of influenza pandemic preparedness. The emergence of SARS-CoV-2 and subsequent expansion into a pandemic has put new and unanticipated demands on laboratory operations since April 2020. Administrative changes, investigative methods requiring increased demand for inactivation and validation of sample removal, and the adoption of a new animal model into the space required all arms of our Biorisk Management System (BMS) to respond with speed and innovation.

Results: In this report, we describe the outcomes of three major operational changes that were implemented to adapt the ABSL-3+ select agent space into a multipathogen laboratory. First were administrative controls that were revised and developed with new Institutional Biosafety Committee protocols, laboratory space segregation, training of staff, and occupational health changes for potential exposure to SARS-CoV-2 inside the laboratory. Second were extensive inactivation and validation experiments performed for both highly pathogenic avian influenza and SARS-CoV-2 to meet the demands for sample removal to a lower biosafety level. Third was the establishment of a new caging system to house Syrian Golden hamsters for SARS-CoV-2 risk assessment modeling.

Summary: The demands placed on biocontainment laboratories for response to SARS-CoV-2 has highlighted the importance of a robust BMS. In a relatively short time, the ABSL-3+ was able to adapt from a single select agent space to a multipathogen laboratory and expand our pandemic response capacity.

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Source
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC9908283PMC
http://dx.doi.org/10.1089/apb.2021.0030DOI Listing

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