Information and Agreement in the Reputation Game Simulation.

Modern communication habits are largely shaped by the extensive use of social media and other online communication platforms. The enormous amount of available data and speed with which new information arises, however, often suffices to cause misunderstandings, false conclusions, or otherwise disturbed opinion formation processes. To investigate some of these effects we use an agent-based model on gossip and reputation dynamics with 50 agents, including Bayesian knowledge updates under bounded rationality and up to the second-order theory of mind effects. Thereby, we observe the occurrence of reputation boosts from fake images, as well as the advantage of hiding one's opinion in order to become a strong information trader. In addition, the simulations show fundamentally different mechanisms for reaching high agreement with others and becoming well-informed. Additionally, we investigate the robustness of our results with respect to different knowledge-update mechanisms and argue why it makes sense to especially emphasize the margins of distribution when judging a bounded quantity such as honesty in a reputation game simulation.