In this short response to Gray's article Capacity and Decision Making we double down on our argument that risk-relativity is a nonsense. Risk relativity is the claim that we should set a higher standard of competence for a person to make a risky choice than to make a safe choice. Gray's response largely involves calling attention to the complexities, ramifications and multiple value implications of decision-making, but we do not deny any of this. Using the notion of quality of care mentioned by Gray, we construct an argument that might be used to support risk relativity. But it is no more persuasive than the arguments put forward by risk-relativists.
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http://dx.doi.org/10.1136/medethics-2022-108379 | DOI Listing |
J Med Ethics
December 2022
Bioethics Centre, Dunedin School of Medicine, Dunedin, New Zealand.
In this short response to Gray's article Capacity and Decision Making we double down on our argument that risk-relativity is a nonsense. Risk relativity is the claim that we should set a higher standard of competence for a person to make a risky choice than to make a safe choice. Gray's response largely involves calling attention to the complexities, ramifications and multiple value implications of decision-making, but we do not deny any of this.
View Article and Find Full Text PDFJ Med Ethics
November 2022
Bioethics Centre, University of Otago Medical School, Dunedin, New Zealand.
If a person is competent to consent to a treatment, is that person necessarily competent to refuse the very same treatment? Risk relativists answer no to this question. If the refusal of a treatment is risky, we may demand a higher level of decision-making capacity to choose this option. The position is known as asymmetry.
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