The successful prediction of new phenomena by scientific theories has gained much interest in philosophy. I will discuss a case that is often taken to be such a successful prediction within physics: Bose-Einstein condensation. The common story goes: the phenomenon was predicted in 1925 by Einstein, and the prediction was confirmed in 1995 at JILA and MIT. I will discuss the history of Bose-Einstein condensation and argue that the observations made in 1995 were inconceivable in several ways in 1925. Therefore, it stands to reason that this is not a story of a confirmed prediction, at least not in the common sense of "prediction". I will suggest that it would be worthwhile for philosophers to investigate further into differences between types of predictions and the various roles those play in science.
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http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.shpsa.2022.02.014 | DOI Listing |
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