Objective correlates-behavioral, functional, and neural-provide essential tools for the scientific study of consciousness. But reliance on these correlates should not lead to the 'fallacy of misplaced objectivity': the assumption that only objective properties should and can be accounted for objectively through science. Instead, what needs to be explained scientifically is what experience is intrinsically-its subjective properties-not just what we can do with it extrinsically. And it must be explained; otherwise the way experience feels would turn out to be magical rather than physical. We argue that it is possible to account for subjective properties objectively once we move beyond cognitive functions and realize what experience is and how it is structured. Drawing on integrated information theory, we show how an objective science of the subjective can account, in strictly physical terms, for both the essential properties of every experience and the specific properties that make particular experiences feel the way they do.
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http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/nc/niab032 | DOI Listing |
Front Psychol
August 2024
Trinity College, Hartford, CT, United States.
Front Psychol
April 2024
Department of Psychology, American University of Beirut, Beirut, Lebanon.
The neuroscience of creativity is built on a tacit and near universal assumption that is false. Paradoxically, this is not contentious; once made explicit, the assumption is readily conceded as false. Psychology regards creativity as made up of many complex, multifaceted, and varied cognitive and emotional processes deployed across many different domains.
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October 2023
Independent Researcher, Knetzgau, Germany.
In the philosophy of mind, neuroscience, and psychology, the causal relationship between phenomenal consciousness, mentation, and brain states has always been a matter of debate. On the one hand, material monism posits consciousness and mind as pure brain epiphenomena. One of its most stringent lines of reasoning relies on a 'loss-of-function lesion premise,' according to which, since brain lesions and neurochemical modifications lead to cognitive impairment and/or altered states of consciousness, there is no reason to doubt the mind-brain identity.
View Article and Find Full Text PDFFront Hum Neurosci
December 2022
Laboratory for Perceptual and Cognitive Systems, Faculty of Computing, University of Latvia, Riga, Latvia.
In modern vision science, illusions are compelling phenomena useful as tools to explore vision under limiting psychophysical conditions. Illusions manifest at least two issues that challenge scientists. The first issue is related to the definition of illusion and to the complexity of the mismatch between the geometrical/physical and the phenomenal domains.
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