Knowledge-how is the kind of knowledge implicated in skill employment and acquisition. Intellectualists claim that knowledge-how is a special type of propositional knowledge. Anti-intellectualists claim that knowledge-how is not propositional. We argue that both views face two open challenges. The first challenge pertains to the relationship between informational states and motor variability. The second pertains to the epistemic function of practice that leads to skill (and knowledge-how). The aim of this paper is to suggest a general conceptual framework based on functional information with both intellectualist and anti-intellectualist features. Our proposal, we argue, avoids the above challenges, and can further the debate on knowledge-how and skill.
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http://dx.doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2021.634968 | DOI Listing |
Front Psychol
September 2021
Department of Brain & Cognitive Sciences and Philosophy, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Beersheba, Israel.
Knowledge-how is the kind of knowledge implicated in skill employment and acquisition. Intellectualists claim that knowledge-how is a special type of propositional knowledge. Anti-intellectualists claim that knowledge-how is not propositional.
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