In a thought-provoking article in Bioethics, Andrea Lavazza defends the view that for reasons of fairness, those who cannot benefit from the use of performance-enhancing methods such as transcranial direct current stimulation (tDCS) should receive compensation for their inability. First, we argue that Lavazza's proposal to compensate athletes who are non-responsive to tDCS is practically unfeasible. Second, the compensation principle-which he appeals to in his defense of his compensation scheme-is false, as it is incoherent to focus only on the compensation of athletes who respond less well to tDCS, and not to compensate athletes who respond less well to all other types of enhancers such as mental training and food supplements.
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http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/bioe.12908 | DOI Listing |
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