How non-epistemic values can be epistemically beneficial in scientific classification.

Stud Hist Philos Sci

Department of Philosophy, University of Calgary, 2500 University Drive, Northwest Calgary, Alberta, T2N 1N4, Canada. Electronic address:

Published: December 2020

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http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.shpsa.2020.08.002DOI Listing

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