Although rationalization about one's own beliefs and actions can improve an individual's future decisions, beliefs can provide other benefits unrelated to their epistemic truth value, such as group cohesion and identity. A model of resource-rational cognition that accounts for these benefits may explain unexpected and seemingly irrational thought patterns, such as belief polarization.
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Ontological pluralism and social values.
Stud Hist Philos Sci
April 2024
Philosophy Program, Graduate Center, City University of New York, 365 Fifth Avenue, New York, NY, 10016, USA. Electronic address:
There seems to be an emerging consensus among many philosophers of science that non-epistemic values ought to play a role in the process of scientific reasoning itself. Recently, a number of philosophers have focused on the role of values in scientific classification or taxonomy. Their claim is that a choice of ontology or taxonomic scheme can only be made, or should only be made, by appealing to non-epistemic or social values.
View Article and Find Full Text PDFBayesianism from a philosophical perspective and its application to medicine.
Int J Biostat
November 2023
Department of Philosophy and Centre for Reasoning, University of Kent, Canterbury, UK.
Bayesian philosophy and Bayesian statistics have diverged in recent years, because Bayesian philosophers have become more interested in philosophical problems other than the foundations of statistics and Bayesian statisticians have become less concerned with philosophical foundations. One way in which this divergence manifests itself is through the use of direct inference principles: Bayesian philosophers routinely advocate principles that require calibration of degrees of belief to available non-epistemic probabilities, while Bayesian statisticians rarely invoke such principles. As I explain, however, the standard Bayesian framework cannot coherently employ direct inference principles.
View Article and Find Full Text PDFValue management and model pluralism in climate science.
Stud Hist Philos Sci
August 2021
UCLouvain, Earth and Life Institute, Belgium. Electronic address:
Non-epistemic values pervade climate modelling, as is now well documented and widely discussed in the philosophy of climate science. Recently, Parker and Winsberg have drawn attention to what can be termed "epistemic inequality": this is the risk that climate models might more accurately represent the future climates of the geographical regions prioritised by the values of the modellers. In this paper, we promote value management as a way of overcoming epistemic inequality.
View Article and Find Full Text PDFBelief as a non-epistemic adaptive benefit.
Behav Brain Sci
April 2020
Department of Psychology, University of Toronto, Toronto, ON, CanadaM5S 3G3.
Although rationalization about one's own beliefs and actions can improve an individual's future decisions, beliefs can provide other benefits unrelated to their epistemic truth value, such as group cohesion and identity. A model of resource-rational cognition that accounts for these benefits may explain unexpected and seemingly irrational thought patterns, such as belief polarization.
View Article and Find Full Text PDFHuman visual exploration reduces uncertainty about the sensed world.
PLoS One
February 2018
Wellcome Trust Centre for Neuroimaging, Institute of Neurology, University College London, London, United Kingdom.
In previous papers, we introduced a normative scheme for scene construction and epistemic (visual) searches based upon active inference. This scheme provides a principled account of how people decide where to look, when categorising a visual scene based on its contents. In this paper, we use active inference to explain the visual searches of normal human subjects; enabling us to answer some key questions about visual foraging and salience attribution.
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