Although people often recognize the moral value of impartial behavior (i.e., not favoring specific individuals), it is unclear when, if ever, people recognize the moral value of partiality. The current studies investigated whether information about special obligations to specific individuals, particularly kin, is integrated into moral judgments. In Studies 1 and 2, agents who helped a stranger were judged as more morally good and trustworthy than those who helped kin, but agents who helped a stranger, instead of kin were judged as less morally good and trustworthy than those who did the opposite. In Studies 3 and 4, agents who simply neglected a stranger were judged as less morally bad and untrustworthy than those who neglected kin. Study 4 also demonstrated that the violation (vs. fulfillment) of perceived obligations underlaid all judgment patterns. Study 5 demonstrated boundary conditions: When occupying roles requiring impartiality, agents who helped a stranger instead of kin were judged as more morally good and trustworthy than agents who did the opposite. These findings illuminate the importance of obligations in structuring moral judgment.

Download full-text PDF

Source
http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0956797619900321DOI Listing

Publication Analysis

Top Keywords

judged morally
16
agents helped
12
helped stranger
12
morally good
12
good trustworthy
12
special obligations
8
moral judgment
8
people recognize
8
recognize moral
8
specific individuals
8

Similar Publications

Children's cost-benefit analysis about agents who act for the greater good.

Cognition

December 2024

Department of Psychology & Neuroscience, Duke University 417 Chapel Drive, Box 90086, Durham, NC 27708, USA. Electronic address:

Acting for the greater good often involves paying a personal cost to benefit the collective. In two studies, we investigate how children (N = 184, M = 8.02 years, SD = 1.

View Article and Find Full Text PDF

People generate evaluations of different attitude objects based on their goals and aspects of the social context. Prior research suggests that people can shift between at least three types of evaluations to judge whether something is good or bad: (how costly or beneficial it is), (whether it is aligned with moral norms), and (whether it feels good; Van Bavel et al., 2012).

View Article and Find Full Text PDF

When being unattractive is an advantage: effects of face perception on intuitive culpability judgments.

Psychiatr Psychol Law

January 2024

Department of Psychology, Universidad Nacional de Colombia, Bogota, Colombia.

This experiment explored the influence of facial attractiveness and trustworthiness on guilty judgments. We recruited 128 participants, randomly assigned to high and low time pressure conditions to act as judges in a simulated case. Participants judged nine male faces from the Chicago Face Database with three attractiveness levels (unattractive, neutral and attractive), featuring a 2 × 3 mixed factorial design, with consistent standardized average levels of face trustworthiness.

View Article and Find Full Text PDF

Does the amount of perceived moral responsibility correspond to the magnitude of the act to the same degree regardless of whether the act is moral or immoral? In four experiments (N = 1617; all preregistered), we found that-when evaluating two agents who performed similar acts but with different magnitude-observers judged greater differences in their moral responsibility when those acts were moral than when they were immoral. That is, the same difference in magnitude had greater influence on perceived moral responsibility for moral acts compared to immoral acts. Furthermore, we also found that the asymmetry effect impacted perceivers' judgment of the moral character of the agent (Studies 2 and 3).

View Article and Find Full Text PDF

Recent work has supported the role of reasoning in third-party moral judgment of harm transgressions. In particular, reasoning may increase the weight of intention in moral judgment, especially following accidental harm, a situation that presumably requires judges to balance considerations about the outcome endured by a victim on the one hand and considerations about an agent's intention to cause harm on the other hand. Three preregistered lab-based studies aimed to test the causal contribution of reasoning to moral judgment of harm transgressions using experimental manipulations borrowed from the reasoning literature: time pressure (Experiment 1), cognitive load (Experiment 2), and priming (Experiment 3).

View Article and Find Full Text PDF

Want AI Summaries of new PubMed Abstracts delivered to your In-box?

Enter search terms and have AI summaries delivered each week - change queries or unsubscribe any time!