Attacks on genetic privacy via uploads to genealogical databases.

Elife

Center for Population Biology, University of California, Davis, Davis, United States.

Published: January 2020

Direct-to-consumer (DTC) genetics services are increasingly popular, with tens of millions of customers. Several DTC genealogy services allow users to upload genetic data to search for relatives, identified as people with genomes that share identical by state (IBS) regions. Here, we describe methods by which an adversary can learn database genotypes by uploading multiple datasets. For example, an adversary who uploads approximately 900 genomes could recover at least one allele at SNP sites across up to 82% of the genome of a median person of European ancestries. In databases that detect IBS segments using unphased genotypes, approximately 100 falsified uploads can reveal enough genetic information to allow genome-wide genetic imputation. We provide a proof-of-concept demonstration in the GEDmatch database, and we suggest countermeasures that will prevent the exploits we describe.

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Source
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC6992384PMC
http://dx.doi.org/10.7554/eLife.51810DOI Listing

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