Examining Misaligned Incentives for Payers and Manufacturers in Value-Based Pharmaceutical Contracts.

J Manag Care Spec Pharm

UPMC Centers for Value-Based Pharmacy Initiatives and High-Value Health Care, UPMC Insurance Services Division, and University of Pittsburgh Division of General Internal Medicine, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania.

Published: January 2020

Value-based pharmaceutical contracts (VBPCs) are performance-based reimbursement agreements between health care payers and pharmaceutical manufacturers in which the price, quantity, or nature of reimbursement is tied to value-based outcomes. As value-based payment models have permeated through much of the health care payment landscape via reimbursement to payers and providers, VBPCs offer opportunities for manufacturers to similarly engage in performance-based models. This article compares 2 VBPC schemes: "pay-for-failure" schemes, in which manufacturers offer rebates or discounts to payers for treatment failure, and "pay-for-success" schemes, in which manufacturers offer rebates or discounts to payers for treatment success. Each method has its own short-term and long-term trade-offs, and both lead to some degree of misaligned incentives between payers and manufacturers. These incentive differences have important downstream effects, influencing patient selection, provision of wraparound services, and nature of reimbursements. This analysis contrasts potential benefits and disadvantages for each of these approaches and offers potential solutions to address misalignment. For example, although pay-for-success models may be more aligned between payers and manufacturers, pay-for-failure contracts can be innovative and effective in controlling costs and/or improving outcomes. To illustrate, VBPCs aimed to reduce costs could incorporate total cost of care reduction as a value-based outcome. The authors encourage payers and manufacturers to consider a blended alternative where pay-for-failure and pay-for-success outcomes could be incorporated as VBPC outcomes. Since little is known about the effect of each scheme on outcomes, further research on VBPCs is necessary to fully understand how differing incentives ultimately affect clinical outcomes and costs. DISCLOSURES: No outside funding supported the writing of this article. Good and Kelly are employed by the UPMC Centers for Value-Based Pharmacy Initiatives and High-Value Health Care, and Parekh was employed by the UPMC Centers for Value-Based Pharmacy Initiatives and High-Value Health Care at the time of this study. The authors have no other disclosures to report.

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Source
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC10390966PMC
http://dx.doi.org/10.18553/jmcp.2020.26.1.63DOI Listing

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