A field experiment examines how moral behavior, moral thoughts, and self-benefiting behavior affect daily well-being. Using experience sampling technology, we randomly grouped participants over 10 days to either behave morally, have moral thoughts, or do something positive for themselves. Participants received treatment-specific instructions in the morning of 5 days and no instructions on the other 5 control days. At each day's end, participants completed measures that examined, among others, subjective well-being, self-perceived morality and empathy, and social isolation and closeness. Full analyses found limited evidence for treatment- versus control-day differences. However, restricting analyses to occasions on which participants complied with instructions revealed treatment- versus control-day main effects on all measures, while showing that self-perceived morality and empathy toward others particularly increased in the moral deeds and moral thoughts group. These findings suggest that moral behavior, moral thoughts, and self-benefiting behavior are all effective means of boosting well-being, but only moral deeds and, perhaps surprisingly, also moral thoughts strengthen the moral self-concept and empathy. Results from an additional study assessing laypeople's predictions suggest that people do not fully intuit this pattern of results. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2020 APA, all rights reserved).
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Br J Psychol
January 2025
School of Psychology & Institute of Moral Education Research, Nanjing Normal University, Nanjing, China.
This study reports new evidence that young people in Mainland China are now bicultural. We followed the established method of testing biculturalism by priming participants with images from two different cultures and measuring whether those images activate different thought styles. First, we replicated findings from 25 years ago that college students in Hong Kong are bicultural (Study 1).
View Article and Find Full Text PDFJ Exp Psychol Gen
January 2025
Department of Psychology, University of Southern California.
Does aligning misinformation content with individuals' core moral values facilitate its spread? We investigate this question in three behavioral experiments ( = 615; = 505; ₂ = 533) that examine how the alignment of audience values and misinformation framing affects sharing behavior, in conjunction with analyzing real-world Twitter data ( = 20,235; 809,414 tweets) that explores how aligning the moral values of message senders with misinformation content influences its dissemination in the context of COVID-19 vaccination misinformation. First, we investigate how aligning messages' moral framing with participants' moral values impacts participants' intentions to share true and false news headlines and whether this effect is driven by a lack of analytical thinking. Our results show that framing a post such that it aligns with audiences' moral values leads to increased sharing intentions, independent of headline familiarity, and participants' political ideology but find no effect of analytical thinking.
View Article and Find Full Text PDFJ Exp Psychol Gen
January 2025
Department of Philosophy, Yale University.
People attribute purposes in both mundane and profound ways-such as when thinking about the purpose of a knife and the purpose of a life. In three studies (total = 13,720 observations from = 3,430 participants), we tested whether these seemingly very different forms of purpose attributions might actually involve the same cognitive processes. We examined the impacts of four factors on purpose attributions in six domains (artifacts, social institutions, animals, body parts, sacred objects, and human lives).
View Article and Find Full Text PDFReports an error in "One thought too few: An adaptive rationale for punishing negligence" by Arunima Sarin and Fiery Cushman (, 2024[Apr], Vol 131[3], 812-824). In the original article, the copyright attribution was incorrectly listed, and the Creative Commons CC BY license disclaimer was incorrectly omitted from the author note. The correct copyright is "© 2024 The Author(s)," and the omitted disclaimer is present as: Open Access funding provided by University College London: This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.
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