Having positive moral traits is central to one's sense of self, and people generally are motivated to maintain a positive view of the self in the present. But it remains unclear how people foster a positive, morally good view of the self in the present. We suggest that recollecting and reflecting on moral and immoral actions from the personal past jointly help to construct a morally good view of the current self in complementary ways. More specifically, across four studies we investigated the extent to which people believe they have changed over time after recollecting their own moral or immoral behaviors from the personal past. Our results indicate that recollecting past immoral actions is associated with stronger impressions of dissimilarity and change in the sense of self over time than recollecting past moral actions. These effects held for diverse domains of morality (i.e., honesty/dishonesty, helping/harming, fairness/unfairness, and loyalty/disloyalty), and they remained even after accounting for objective, calendar time. Further supporting a motivational explanation, these effects held when people recollected their own past actions but not when they recollected the actions of other people.
Download full-text PDF |
Source |
---|---|
http://dx.doi.org/10.3758/s13421-018-0880-y | DOI Listing |
J Soc Psychol
January 2025
School of Psychology, Zhejiang Normal University, Jinhua.
Moral licensing, a phenomenon where initial moral behavior can lead to later immoral behavior, challenges the sustainability of moral behavior over short-term periods. In the framework of moral self-regulation, current research examined the inhibitory effects of high moral identity and moral elevation on moral licensing. Across three studies we consistently found that recalling past moral behavior can trigger moral licensing (Study 1, 2, 3).
View Article and Find Full Text PDFJ Hist Behav Sci
January 2025
UCL, London, UK.
From the second half of the nineteenth-century treatment of "imbecile" children in Britain underwent significant change. Examining the period from 1870 to 1920 when imbecility became a discrete category, and a matter of concern in policy and practice, this paper focuses on conceptualizations around fright, idleness, morality, and parental mental state as behavioral, emotional, and psychological causes and attributions of "imbecility" in children. I view this in light of the Victorian emotional culture of "care and control," which was driven by a shift in cost-cutting and fear of the impact of "imbecile children" on society, justifying exclusions, defining boundaries, and driving change.
View Article and Find Full Text PDFThis essay is an attempt to determine what Robert Bernasconi's body of work in Critical Philosophy of Race can teach us about the way in which we, philosophers and professors of philosophy, ought to treat our institutional heritage. What should we make, for instance, of moral claims made by philosophers of the modern era who - tacitly or explicitly - manifested certain levels of endorsement toward the Atlantic Slave Trade? How should we comprehend the conceptual tools that we have inherited from them, knowing that those were formulated alongside justificatory claims for the enslavement of Africans - claims that we now deem undoubtably and universally immoral? I extract from Bernasconi's writings an implicit methodology that can be broken down into three main moves: (1) a historiographical work, akin to Michel Foucault's 'archaeological' method, aimed at uncovering the material conditions that allowed for the emergence of philosophical ideas of the past, (2) a dialectical work aimed at interpreting this collection of historical data through the critical lens of race, and (3) a pedagogical work aimed at transforming the practice of academic philosophy in light of the critique. I conclude that his methodological contribution culminates in an invitation to revisit and transform the past of the institution by treating the history of academic philosophy as philosophically and conceptually relevant rather than merely incidental.
View Article and Find Full Text PDFBehav Sci (Basel)
December 2024
Department of Cognitive, Social and Organizational Psychology, Faculty of Psychology, University of La Laguna, 38200 San Cristóbal de La Laguna, Spain.
People often perceive their moral judgments as objective and unbiased, yet research indicates that positive interpersonal attitudes lead to more lenient moral character assessments. Here we investigate how likeability towards moral transgressors and the different moral rationalization strategies they may employ impact both the perceived severity of the immoral behavior and the attribution of humanity to the transgressor. In two studies, participants ( = 475) engaged in a 2 (likeability towards the transgressor: high vs.
View Article and Find Full Text PDFBehav Sci (Basel)
December 2024
School of Psychology Sport and Health Sciences, University of Portsmouth, Portsmouth PO1 2UP, UK.
A trait labelled as "morality" has been argued to be perceived and prioritised during first impressions of faces; however, immorality is not a homogenous concept. Violations of purity are frequently distinguished from other violations via distinct behavioural and emotional patterns, arguably stemming from physical disgust, sexual content, or "weirdness" impure scenarios. In the current research, participants were asked to rate unfamiliar faces based on social traits and their likelihood of engaging in immoral or nonmoral behaviours.
View Article and Find Full Text PDFEnter search terms and have AI summaries delivered each week - change queries or unsubscribe any time!