Evolutionary game theory is an important tool to model animal and human behaviour. A key class of games is the social dilemmas, where cooperation benefits the group but defection benefits the individual within any group. Previous works have considered which games qualify as social dilemmas, and different categories of dilemmas, but have generally concentrated on fixed sizes of interacting groups. In this paper, we develop a systematic investigation of social dilemmas on all group sizes. This allows for a richer definition of social dilemmas. For example, while increasing a group size to include another defector is always bad for all existing group members, extra cooperators can be good or bad, depending upon the particular dilemma and group size. We consider a number of commonly used social dilemmas in this context and in particular show the effect of variability in group sizes for the example of a population comprising negative binomially distributed group sizes. The most striking effect is that increasing the variability in group sizes for non-threshold public goods games is favourable for the evolution of cooperation. The situation for threshold public goods games and commons dilemmas is more complex.
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http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11538-018-00545-1 | DOI Listing |
J Clin Psychol
January 2025
Department of Clinical Psychology and Psychobiology, The Institute of Neurosciences, Universitat de Barcelona, Barcelona, Spain.
Based on the repertory grid technique, we developed Explore Your Meanings (EYME), a digital platform that helps patients explore identity values and internal conflicts using virtual reality (VR). EYME was part of a research project treating depression in young adults, including 10 weekly, 1-h sessions aimed at changing personal constructs-cognitive schemas that shape how individuals interpret reality. We present the case of Mary, a 21-year-old woman diagnosed with persistent major depressive disorder and social phobia.
View Article and Find Full Text PDFRisk Anal
January 2025
School of Political Science and Public Administration, Wuhan University, Wuhan, China.
The unpredictability of the epidemics caused by new, unknown viruses, combined with differing responsibilities among government departments, often leads to a prisoner's dilemma in epidemic information governance. In this context, the whistle-blower effect in the health departments leads to delayed reporting to avoid potential retaliation, and the cry-wolf effect in the administrative departments results in sustained observation to avoid ineffective warnings. To address these challenges, we employ game theory to analyze the dynamics of epidemic information governance and focus on two external governance mechanisms-superior accountability and media supervision-that can help resolve the prisoner's dilemma during and after an outbreak.
View Article and Find Full Text PDFBr J Soc Psychol
January 2025
Faculty of Psychology, University of Warsaw, Warsaw, Poland.
In three studies (total N = 622), the effects of threat to control on subsequent moral judgement were examined. After recalling a lack-of-control experience, participants evaluated the morality of a protagonist's decisions in a series of incongruent moral dilemmas. We found that a control-threatening reminder made moral judgements more utilitarian on the deontological-utilitarian dimension, which is consistent with the control motivation theory.
View Article and Find Full Text PDFJ Intellect Dev Disabil
September 2024
Department of Clinical Child and Family Studies, Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, Amsterdam, Netherlands.
Background: Intellectual disability organisations in the Netherlands are seeking to improve clients' quality of care by implementing methods that reduce involuntary care. This study described insights gained from sharing tacit and experiential implementation knowledge in Communities of Practice (CoP).
Method: In a participatory research, managers, policymakers, experts-by-experience, support staff, and researchers participated in two CoP.
Soc Neurosci
January 2025
School of Health Science and Engineering, University of Shanghai for Science and Technology, Shanghai, China.
The chicken game, a well-established social dilemma paradigm, is widely used to study cooperative and competitive behaviors. Strategic decision-making in this game is influenced by the outcomes of cooperative and competitive interactions, with feedback-related event-related potentials (ERPs) during the feedback phase being a primary research focus. However, it remains unclear whether specific ERP components associated with strategic decision-making are present during the response phase.
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