Traditional replication dynamic model and the corresponding concept of evolutionary stable strategy (ESS) only takes into account whether the system can return to the equilibrium after being subjected to a small disturbance. In the real world, due to continuous noise, the ESS of the system may not be stochastically stable. In this paper, a model of voluntary public goods game with punishment is studied in a stochastic situation. Unlike the existing model, we describe the evolutionary process of strategies in the population as a generalized quasi-birth-and-death process. And we investigate the stochastic stable equilibrium (SSE) instead. By numerical experiments, we get all possible SSEs of the system for any combination of parameters, and investigate the influence of parameters on the probabilities of the system to select different equilibriums. It is found that in the stochastic situation, the introduction of the punishment and non-participation strategies can change the evolutionary dynamics of the system and equilibrium of the game. There is a large range of parameters that the system selects the cooperative states as its SSE with a high probability. This result provides us an insight and control method for the evolution of cooperation in the public goods game in stochastic situations.

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http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5700967PMC
http://dx.doi.org/10.1038/s41598-017-16140-8DOI Listing

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