The reciprocal exchange of goods and services among social partners is a conundrum in evolutionary biology because of its proneness to cheating, but also the behavioral and cognitive mechanisms involved in such mutual cooperation are hotly debated. Extreme viewpoints range from the assumption that, at the proximate level, observed cases of "direct reciprocity" can be merely explained by basic instrumental and Pavlovian association processes, to the other extreme implying that "cultural factors" must be involved, as is often attributed to reciprocal cooperation among humans. Here we argue that neither one nor the other extreme conception is likely to explain proximate mechanisms underlying reciprocal altruism in animals. In particular, we outline that Pavlovian association processes are not sufficient to explain the documented reciprocal cooperation among Norway rats, as has been recently argued.
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http://dx.doi.org/10.3758/s13420-016-0236-z | DOI Listing |
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