Eager feelings and vigilant reasons: Regulatory focus differences in judging moral wrongs.

For over a decade, moral psychologists have been actively researching the processes underlying moral judgments that are made intuitively without reference to an action's concrete harms or injustice, such as the well-known case of nonprocreative, consensual incest. We suggest that the reason some judge such scenarios as wrong (using intuitive feelings) and others do not (using deliberative reasons) is due to an important motivational distinction. Consistent with this view, across 7 studies, we demonstrate that negative judgments of such moral scenarios are more intense when processed in the promotion focus compared to the prevention focus, and that this is due to differences in whether eager (intuitive feelings) versus vigilant (deliberative reasons) means are employed in judging these moral wrongs. By examining both boundary conditions and possible underlying mechanisms for regulatory focus differences in moral judgment intensity, we expand our understanding of the differences between promotion and prevention regarding how proscriptive judgments are processed, while integrating these differences with existing theories in moral psychology.