Severity: Warning
Message: file_get_contents(https://...@pubfacts.com&api_key=b8daa3ad693db53b1410957c26c9a51b4908&a=1): Failed to open stream: HTTP request failed! HTTP/1.1 429 Too Many Requests
Filename: helpers/my_audit_helper.php
Line Number: 176
Backtrace:
File: /var/www/html/application/helpers/my_audit_helper.php
Line: 176
Function: file_get_contents
File: /var/www/html/application/helpers/my_audit_helper.php
Line: 250
Function: simplexml_load_file_from_url
File: /var/www/html/application/helpers/my_audit_helper.php
Line: 3122
Function: getPubMedXML
File: /var/www/html/application/controllers/Detail.php
Line: 575
Function: pubMedSearch_Global
File: /var/www/html/application/controllers/Detail.php
Line: 489
Function: pubMedGetRelatedKeyword
File: /var/www/html/index.php
Line: 316
Function: require_once
Several recent articles have weighed in on the question of whether moral philosophers can be counted as moral experts. One argument denying this has been rejected by both sides of the debate. According to this argument, the extent of disagreement in modern moral philosophy prevents moral philosophers from being classified as moral experts. Call this the Argument From Disagreement (AD). In this article, I defend a version of AD. Insofar as practical issues in moral philosophy are characterized by disagreement between moral philosophers who are more or less equally well credentialed on the issue, non-philosophers have no good reasons to defer to their views.
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Source |
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http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/bioe.12173 | DOI Listing |
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