Response to Mahon: Unburdening cognition from abstract symbols.

B. Z. Mahon (see record 2015-22897-004) has provided a real service to those researchers investigating human cognition by clearly framing much of the debate between an embodied approach to cognition and an abstract alternative. There are several areas in which Mahon and A. M. Glenberg agree. For example, Glenberg (although not all embodiment theorists) agrees that a major question is the degree to which bodily and neural sensorimotor activity constitutes cognition. In addition, the evidence is clear that there is something akin to a spread of activation amongst systems, and the very fact of this spread makes it difficult to distinguish embodied from nonembodied positions. There are also several areas about which the authors disagree. For example, Mahon suggests that we need to consider predictions of alternative hypotheses. The alternative he offers is that there is a distinction between concepts and sensorimotor activity. Although it is reasonable to consider this alternative, there is no description of what these nonembodied concepts are in Mahon's essay, just that they are not sensorimotor. Glenberg offers a partial compromise to the argument.