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| http://dx.doi.org/10.1164/rccm.201501-0204ED | DOI Listing |
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Social learning with complex contagion.
Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A
December 2024
Program in Applied Mathematics & Computational Science, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA 19104.
Article Synopsis
- Traditional social learning models suggest that individuals imitating successful neighbors rely on simple contagion, often needing only one interaction to change behavior.
- The study introduces a new framework that incorporates both simple payoff-biased imitation and complex contagion, allowing for multiple exposures before individuals decide to alter their behavior.
- This updated model produces distinct outcomes in various games (like the Prisoner’s Dilemma and Coordination game) compared to traditional models, revealing how social behaviors can evolve in more realistic ways based on the interplay between contagion complexity and imitation bias.
Herd behavior in public goods games.
Phys Rev E
October 2024
Grupo de Investigación Ingeniería de Organización y Logística (IOL), Departamento Ingeniería de Organización, Administración de empresas y Estadística, Escuela Técnica Superior de Ingenieros Industriales, Universidad Politécnica de Madrid, 28006 Madrid, Spain and Grupo Interdisciplinar de Sistemas Complejos (GISC), 28911 Leganés, Madrid, Spain.
The problem of free-riding arises when individuals benefit from a shared resource, service, or public good without contributing proportionately to its provision. This conduct often leads to a collective action problem, as individuals pursue personal gains while relying on the contributions of others. In this study, we present a Bayesian inference model to elucidate the behavior of participants in a public goods game, a conceptual framework that captures the essence of the free-riding problem.
View Article and Find Full Text PDFThe effects of ostracism on preschoolers' over-imitation behaviors.
J Exp Child Psychol
January 2025
Department of Psychology, University of Milano-Bicocca, 20126 Milan, Italy; NeuroMI-Milan Center for Neuroscience, 20126 Milan, Italy.
Over-imitation represents an early developing behavior implicated in the emergence of learning, affective, and social competences. Adult over-imitation is heavily affected by contextual variables such as social ostracism, the experience of being ignored by others in a social context, an experience that threatens several psychological needs, inducing the urge to reaffiliate with a social group to restore the original state of well-being. Yet, the impact of social ostracism on over-imitation in children remains unclear.
View Article and Find Full Text PDFOptimal Evolution Strategy for Continuous Strategy Games on Complex Networks via Reinforcement Learning.
IEEE Trans Neural Netw Learn Syst
September 2024
This article presents an optimal evolution strategy for continuous strategy games on complex networks via reinforcement learning (RL). In the past, evolutionary game theory usually assumed that agents use the same selection intensity when interacting, ignoring the differences in their learning abilities and learning willingness. Individuals are reluctant to change their strategies too much.
View Article and Find Full Text PDFImpact of environmental stochastic fluctuations on the evolutionary stability of imitation dynamics.
Phys Rev E
August 2024
Key Laboratory of Animal Ecology and Conservation Biology, Institute of Zoology, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing 100101, China.
To show the impact of environmental noise on imitation dynamics, the stochastic stability and stochastic evolutionary stability of a discrete-time imitation dynamics with random payoffs are studied in this paper. Based on the stochastic local stability of fixation states and constant interior equilibria in a two-phenotype model, we extend the concept of stochastic evolutionary stability to the stochastic imitation dynamics, which is defined as a strategy such that, if all the members of the population adopt it, then the probability for any mutant strategy to invade the population successfully under the influence of natural selection is arbitrarily low. Our main results show clearly that the stochastic evolutionary stability of the system depends only on the properties of the mean matrix of the random payoff matrix and is independent of the randomness of the random payoff matrix.
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