Past research shows that adults often display poor memory for racially ambiguous and racial outgroup faces, with both face types remembered worse than own-race faces. In the present study, the authors examined whether children also show this pattern of results. They also examined whether emerging essentialist thinking about race predicts children's memory for faces. Seventy-four White children (ages 4-9 years) completed a face-memory task comprising White, Black, and racially ambiguous Black-White faces. Essentialist thinking about race was also assessed (i.e., thinking of race as immutable and biologically based). White children who used essentialist thinking showed the same bias as White adults: They remembered White faces significantly better than they remembered ambiguous and Black faces. However, children who did not use essentialist thinking remembered both White and racially ambiguous faces significantly better than they remembered Black faces. This finding suggests a specific shift in racial thinking wherein the boundaries between racial groups become more discrete, highlighting the importance of how race is conceptualized in judgments of racially ambiguous individuals.
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http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/a0033493 | DOI Listing |
CBE Life Sci Educ
March 2025
Department of Psychology, Northeastern University, Boston, MA, 02115.
Previous research has shown that students employ intuitive thinking when understanding scientific concepts. Three types of intuitive thinking-essentialist, teleological, and anthropic thinking-are used in biology learning and can lead to misconceptions. However, it is unknown how commonly these types of intuitive thinking, or cognitive construals, are used spontaneously in students' explanations across biological concepts and whether this usage is related to endorsement of construal-consistent misconceptions.
View Article and Find Full Text PDFPers Soc Psychol Bull
November 2024
Department of Psychology, North Carolina State University, Raleigh, NC, USA.
Although there is a tendency to think all forms of essentialism-the belief that characteristics are inherent and unchangeable-are similar, some theories suggest different foundations and outcomes. We investigated if belief systems about the stability of political ideology (trait essentialism) and the fundamental nature of partisans (social essentialism) predict prejudice in opposite ways and if they do so via differential relations with blame. Across six studies ( = 2,231), we found that the more people believe the trait of political ideology is fixed (trait essentialism), the more they think that Republicans and Democrats are inherently different (social essentialism).
View Article and Find Full Text PDFDev Sci
January 2025
Department of Psychology, New York University, New York, USA.
People represent many categories and their features as determined by intrinsic essences. These essentialist beliefs reflect biased views of the world that can hinder scientific reasoning and contribute to social prejudice. To consider the extent to which such essentialist views originate from culturally-situated processes, the present study tested the developmental trajectories of essentialist beliefs among children growing up in the United States and China (N = 531; ages 3-6).
View Article and Find Full Text PDFPerspect Behav Sci
September 2024
Department of Psychosocial Health, University of Agder, Grimstad, Norway.
The concept of response strength and the process of strengthening by reinforcement are controversial in terms of their explanatory power. We clarify potential theoretical misconceptions following from a strength-based account such as essentialist thinking and circular reasoning. These problems also arise in the practice of latent variable modeling in psychometrics.
View Article and Find Full Text PDFPeople express essentialist beliefs about social categories from an early age, but essentialist beliefs about specific social categories vary over development and in different contexts. Adapting two paradigms used with Western samples to measure social essentialism, we examined the development of essentialist beliefs about seven social categories (gender, race, nationality, religion, socioeconomic status, ethnicity, and team fan bases) among 5- to 10-year-old children ( = 88) and adults ( = 273) in Iran, a population that is underrepresented in psychology research. Focusing on natural-kind reasoning, we investigated the relative contribution of biological perception of social categories as well as cultural and motivational factors in the development of essentialist beliefs about these categories.
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