The psychological capacity to recognize that others may hold and act on false beliefs has been proposed to reflect an evolved, species-typical adaptation for social reasoning in humans; however, controversy surrounds the developmental timing and universality of this trait. Cross-cultural studies using elicited-response tasks indicate that the age at which children begin to understand false beliefs ranges from 4 to 7 years across societies, whereas studies using spontaneous-response tasks with Western children indicate that false-belief understanding emerges much earlier, consistent with the hypothesis that false-belief understanding is a psychological adaptation that is universally present in early childhood. To evaluate this hypothesis, we used three spontaneous-response tasks that have revealed early false-belief understanding in the West to test young children in three traditional, non-Western societies: Salar (China), Shuar/Colono (Ecuador) and Yasawan (Fiji). Results were comparable with those from the West, supporting the hypothesis that false-belief understanding reflects an adaptation that is universally present early in development.
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http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rspb.2012.2654 | DOI Listing |
BJPsych Open
January 2025
Campbell Family Mental Health Research Institute, Centre for Addiction and Mental Health, Toronto, Canada; Department of Psychiatry, Temerty Faculty of Medicine, University of Toronto, Canada; Institute of Medical Science, Temerty Faculty of Medicine, University of Toronto, Canada; Department of Psychology, Faculty of Arts & Science, University of Toronto, Canada; Department of Psychiatry, The Hospital for Sick Children, Toronto, Canada; Autism Research Centre, Department of Psychiatry, University of Cambridge, UK; Department of Psychiatry, National Taiwan University Hospital, Taiwan; and Department of Psychiatry, National Taiwan University College of Medicine, Taiwan.
Background: Differences in social behaviours are common in young people with neurodevelopmental conditions (NDCs). Recent research challenges the long-standing hypothesis that difficulties in social cognition explain social behaviour differences.
Aims: We examined how difficulties regulating one's behaviour, emotions and thoughts to adapt to environmental demands (i.
Front Psychol
January 2025
Department of Psychology, Smith College, Northampton, MA, United States.
Introduction: The role of language in false belief reasoning has been much debated for twenty-five years or more, especially the relative contributions of general language development, complement syntax, vocabulary, and executive function. However, the empirical studies so far have fallen short, in that they generally have too few participants for adequate statistical modeling; they do not include control variables; or they are cross-sectional rather than longitudinal, making inferences about causal direction much more tenuous.
Methods: The present study considers the role of these different variables in the development of false belief reasoning over several months of testing, with 258 children aged three to five years.
Appl Neuropsychol Adult
January 2025
Department of Psychiatry, Seyrantepe Hamidiye Etfal Training and Research Hospital, University of Health Sciences, Istanbul, Turkey.
Background: Theory of mind (ToM) is the ability to make correct inferences from one's own or another person's mental states, such as thoughts, beliefs, desires, and intentions. Although there are a limited number of studies in the literature examining the social cognitive functions of patients with trichotillomania (TTM), no studies have evaluated ToM. This study aimed to compare the ToM skills of patients with TTM and healthy controls.
View Article and Find Full Text PDFCognition
March 2025
Minerva Fast Track Group Milestones of Early Cognitive Development, Max Planck Institute for Human Cognitive and Brain Sciences, Stephanstraße 1A, 04103 Leipzig, Saxony, Germany; Department of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Technology Nuremberg, Ulmenstraße 52i, 90443 Nuremberg, Germany. Electronic address:
As social beings, we excel at understanding what other people think or believe. We even seem to be influenced by the belief of others in situations where it is irrelevant to our current tasks. Such altercentric interference has been proposed to reflect implicit belief processing.
View Article and Find Full Text PDFBr J Dev Psychol
December 2024
Department of Developmental Psychology, University of Hamburg, Hamburg, Germany.
One-year-olds spontaneously inform others, but less is known about the emergence of spontaneous misinforming. The current study investigated whether young children who spontaneously inform ignorant others also deliberately misinform others in matched uninstructed interactions. Conceptually, misinforming provides a convincing case for interaction-based, implicit false belief understanding.
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