Freyd (1987; Finke & Freyd, 1985) suggested that representational momentum (i.e., forward displacement in memory for the location of a moving target) is impervious to error feedback (i.e., is modular or cognitively impenetrable), but studies supporting this claim might not have allowed sufficient opportunity for learning to occur. In the experiment reported here, participants were (a) naive regarding representational momentum, (b) informed about representational momentum but not instructed to counteract it, or (c) informed about representational momentum and instructed to counteract it. All participants exhibited significant displacement. However, participants informed about representational momentum exhibited less forward displacement than did naive participants due to a greater tendency to respond same to probes behind the true--same position. Possible mechanisms of compensation and the notion that displacement reflects both modular (cognitively impenetrable) and nonmodular (cognitively penetrable) components are addressed.
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http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/17470210802194217 | DOI Listing |
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