The Szaszian argument claims that psychiatry is a rhetorical enterprise aimed at providing justification for involuntary treatment. Such treatment, the argument holds, is just when provided to those suffering from demonstrable brain lesions, but it is unjust in cases of "mental illness" because such "illnesses" lack objective histopathology and are therefore fictional. It is here argued that this distinction is irrelevant to the morality or immorality of involuntary treatment, since such treatment inevitably rests on a subjective determination of competency or dangerousness, which is not rendered substantially more objective by the criterion of histopathology. The Szaszian argument subscribes to a naturalistic fallacy in this regard, which leads it to inconsistencies in its philosophy of mind.
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The Myth of Mental Illness: 50 years after publication: What does it mean today?
Ir J Psychol Med
March 2010
International School for Communities,Rights and Inclusion, University of Central Lancashire,England.
In 1960, Thomas Szasz published The Myth of Mental Illness, arguing that mental illness was a harmful myth without a demonstrated basis in biological pathology and with the potential to damage current conceptions of human responsibility. Szasz's arguments have provoked considerable controversy over the past five decades. This paper marks the 50th anniversary of The Myth of Mental Illness by providing commentaries on its contemporary relevance from the perspectives of a range of stakeholders, including a consultant psychiatrist, psychiatric patient, professor of philosophy and mental health, a specialist registrar in psychiatry, and a lecturer in psychiatry.
View Article and Find Full Text PDFThe Szaszian argument claims that psychiatry is a rhetorical enterprise aimed at providing justification for involuntary treatment. Such treatment, the argument holds, is just when provided to those suffering from demonstrable brain lesions, but it is unjust in cases of "mental illness" because such "illnesses" lack objective histopathology and are therefore fictional. It is here argued that this distinction is irrelevant to the morality or immorality of involuntary treatment, since such treatment inevitably rests on a subjective determination of competency or dangerousness, which is not rendered substantially more objective by the criterion of histopathology.
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