Three experiments are presented in which different aspects concerning Heit and Barsalou's (1996) instantiation principle were investigated. Mean typicalities of subordinate categories within superordinates were predicted very accurately for all investigated concepts. Multiple instantiations were shown to yield somewhat better predictions than single instantiation. The instantiation principle also successfully predicted mean typicalities on a different level (i.e., in lower-level concepts). An alternative account of Heit and Barsalou's findings was also proven wrong. Finally, correspondence between empirically obtained and predicted standard deviations is argued to be dubious, because of several possible sources of bias in the observed and predicted values.
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http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09658210244000126 | DOI Listing |
J Gen Intern Med
October 2024
Department of Pulmonary and Critical Care, Intermountain Medical Center Shock Trauma ICU, Murray, UT, USA.
Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A
October 2024
Mechanical Science and Engineering, University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign, Urbana, IL 61801.
Eur Neuropsychopharmacol
January 2025
CNS Discovery Research, Boehringer Ingelheim Pharma GmbH, Biberach, Germany.
Cogn Sci
September 2024
Institute for Neural Computation, Ruhr-University Bochum.
How situated embodied agents may achieve goals using knowledge is the classical question of natural and artificial intelligence. How organisms achieve this with their nervous systems is a central challenge for a neural theory of embodied cognition. To structure this challenge, we borrow terms from Searle's analysis of intentionality in its two directions of fit and six psychological modes (perception, memory, belief, intention-in-action, prior intention, desire).
View Article and Find Full Text PDFEur J Psychol
May 2024
Department of Philosophy, University of Memphis, Memphis, TN, USA.
Although post-cognitivist approaches have shaken the status quo by emphasising the dynamic interactions among the brain, the body, and the environment in cognition, mainstream psychological theories continue to view concepts as primarily representational or skull-bound mental phenomena. As a result, the dynamics of action and the possible impact of material culture on conceptual thinking are poorly understood. In this paper, we explore the process and meaning of conceptual thinking from a material engagement perspective.
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