In this paper, a two-phenotype, single-locus, n -allele matrix game diploid model incorporating interactions between full sibs influencing personal fitness is investigated. Necessary and sufficient conditions for an ESS are given. We show that if a strategy is an ESS for this model with the payoff matrix A, then it must be an ESS for the standard game formulation with payoff matrix A+(r/2) A(T) where r is the probability to interact with a sib, but it is also possible that no ESS exists. Moreover, under the assumption of weak selection, the partial change in phenotype frequencies brings the population closer to an ESS when it exists.
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