The role of memory in human strategy updating in optional public goods game.

Most research suggests that humans can optimize their behavior by imitating other humans. However, it remains unclear whether humans actually imitate others in real-life situations. To address this question, we conducted spatial public goods experiments with voluntary participation.

Evolutionary prisoner's dilemma on evolving random networks.

In this paper, we investigate the evolution of cooperation in the spatial prisoner's dilemma game by incorporating partner choice into the framework of evolutionary game theory. Our research shows that the introduction of partner choice can notably promote the cooperative behavior in the prisoner's dilemma game. All the players are more likely to play the game with cooperators, which makes it easier for cooperators to form alliances.

Survival via cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma game.

By incorporating ecological dynamics into evolutionary games, we introduce natural and unnatural death to the spatial prisoner's dilemma game in which individuals can play mixed strategies. This introduction can give a simple explanation for the emergence and abundance of cooperation in animal and human societies. We found that individuals are more likely to cooperate in a highly competitive environment.

Bounded rationality leads to equilibrium of public goods games.

In this work, we introduce a degree of rationality to the public goods games in which players can determine whether or not to participate, and with it a new mechanism has been established. Existence of the bounded rationality would lead to a new equilibrium which differs from the Nash equilibrium and qualitatively explains the fundamental role of loners' payoff for maintaining cooperation. Meanwhile, it is shown how the potential strategy influences the players' decision.

Bounded rationality in volunteering public goods games.

It is one of the fundamental problems in biology and social sciences how to maintain high levels of cooperation among selfish individuals. Theorists present an effective mechanism promoting cooperation by allowing for voluntary participation in public goods games. But Nash's theory predicts that no one can do better or worse than loners (players unwilling to join the public goods game) in the long run, and that the frequency of participants is independent of loners' payoff.