Sanctioning political speech on social media is driven by partisan norms and identity signaling.

Social media is marked by online firestorms where people pile-on and shame those who say things perceived to be offensive, especially about politically relevant topics. What explains why individuals engage in this sort of sanctioning behavior? We show that two key factors help to explain this pattern. First, on these topics, both offensive speech and subsequent sanctioning are seen as informative about partisanship: people assume that those who say offensive things are out-partisans, and those who criticize them are co-partisans.

The July 2024 Trump assassination attempt was followed by lower in-group support for partisan violence and increased group unity.

The attempted assassination of Donald Trump led to widespread concern that the event would escalate political violence between U.S. partisans.

Affective polarization is uniformly distributed across American States.

US partisans view each other with increasing negativity. While many attribute the growth of such affective polarization to nationally cross-cutting forces, such as ideological partisan sorting or access to partisan media, others emphasize the effects of contextual and institutional forces. For the first time, we introduce and explore data sufficiently granular to fully map the extent of partisan animosity across the US states.

Unraveling polarization: insights into individual and collective dynamics.

Polarization poses a critical threat to the stability of nations around the world, as it impacts climate change, populism, democracy, and global health. This perspective examines the conceptual understanding, measurement challenges, and potential interventions for polarization. Our analysis highlights the distinction and interactions between the individual and collective levels of polarization, conceptually, methodologically, and in terms of interventions.

Persistent polarization: The unexpected durability of political animosity around US elections.

The scholarly literature suggests that, as elections approach, political tensions intensify, and, as they pass, tensions return to pre-election levels. Using a massive new dataset of 66,000 interviews (cross-sectional and panel), we find that animosities are durable and consistent over the course of the 2022 US election. Individuals with more exposure to the campaign tend to be more polarized, and this sentiment endures post-election.

Correcting misperceptions of partisan opponents is not effective at treating democratic ills.

Many warn that the United States is on the brink of democratic collapse, because partisan animosity, support for partisan violence, and support for undemocratic practices are on the rise. Quelling some fears, scholars have offered interventions that use messages to correct misperceptions about citizens' partisan opponents (the "out-party"). In this article, we provide evidence that the effects of these interventions are not as robust or consistent as hoped.

Putting the affect into affective polarisation.

While many believe that affective polarisation poses a significant threat to democratic stability, the definition and operationalisation of the concept varies greatly. This leads to conceptual slippage as well as imprecise tests of the causes and consequences of affective polarisation. In order to clearly identify and target its micro-foundations, we must understand the degree to which political divides are, in fact, affective.

Uncommon and nonpartisan: Antidemocratic attitudes in the American public.

Democratic regimes flourish only when there is broad acceptance of an extensive set of norms and values. In the United States, fundamental democratic norms have recently come under threat from prominent Republican officials. We investigate whether this antidemocratic posture has spread from the elite level to rank-and-file partisans.

Measuring dynamic media bias.

Ideological media bias is increasingly central to the study of politics. Yet, past literature often assumes that the ideological bias of any outlet, at least in the short term, is static and exogenous to the political process. We challenge this assumption.

Negative partisanship is not more prevalent than positive partisanship.

The dominant narrative among scholars and political pundits characterizes American partisanship as overwhelmingly negative, portraying citizens as more repelled by the opposing party than attached to their own party. To assess the valence of partisan identity, we use various measures collected from several new and existing nationally representative surveys and behavioural outcomes obtained from two experiments. Our findings consistently depart from the negative partisanship narrative.

The nonlinear feedback dynamics of asymmetric political polarization.

Using a general model of opinion dynamics, we conduct a systematic investigation of key mechanisms driving elite polarization in the United States. We demonstrate that the self-reinforcing nature of elite-level processes can explain this polarization, with voter preferences accounting for its asymmetric nature. Our analysis suggests that subtle differences in the frequency and amplitude with which public opinion shifts left and right over time may have a differential effect on the self-reinforcing processes of elites, causing Republicans to polarize more quickly than Democrats.

Interindividual cooperation mediated by partisanship complicates Madison's cure for "mischiefs of faction".

Political theorists have long argued that enlarging the political sphere to include a greater diversity of interests would cure the ills of factions in a pluralistic society. While the scope of politics has expanded dramatically over the past 75 y, polarization is markedly worse. Motivated by this paradox, we take a bottom-up approach to explore how partisan individual-level dynamics in a diverse (multidimensional) issue space can shape collective-level factionalization via an emergent dimensionality reduction.

Link recommendation algorithms and dynamics of polarization in online social networks.

The level of antagonism between political groups has risen in the past years. Supporters of a given party increasingly dislike members of the opposing group and avoid intergroup interactions, leading to homophilic social networks. While new connections offline are driven largely by human decisions, new connections on online social platforms are intermediated by link recommendation algorithms, e.

Auditing local news presence on Google News.

Local news outlets have struggled to stay open in the more competitive market of digital media. Some have noted that this decline may be due to the ways in which digital platforms direct attention to some news outlets and not others. To test this theory, we collected 12.

Binding Moral Foundations and the Narrowing of Ideological Conflict to the Traditional Morality Domain.

Moral foundations theory (MFT) posits that binding moral foundations (purity, authority, and ingroup loyalty) are rooted in the need for groups to promote order and cohesion, and that they therefore underlie political conservatism. We present evidence that binding foundations (and the related construct of disgust sensitivity) are associated with lower levels of ideological polarization on political issues outside the domain of moral traditionalism. Consistent support for this hypothesis was obtained from three large American Internet-based samples and one large national sample of New Zealanders (combined N = 7,874).

Do needs for security and certainty predict cultural and economic conservatism? A cross-national analysis.

We examine whether individual differences in needs for security and certainty predict conservative (vs. liberal) position on both cultural and economic political issues and whether these effects are conditional on nation-level characteristics and individual-level political engagement. Analyses with cross-national data from 51 nations reveal that valuing conformity, security, and tradition over self-direction and stimulation (a) predicts ideological self-placement on the political right, but only among people high in political engagement and within relatively developed nations, ideologically constrained nations, and non-Eastern European nations, (b) reliably predicts right-wing cultural attitudes and does so more strongly within developed and ideologically constrained nations, and (c) on average predicts left-wing economic attitudes but does so more weakly among people high in political engagement, within ideologically constrained nations, and within non-Eastern European nations.

How Christians reconcile their personal political views and the teachings of their faith: projection as a means of dissonance reduction.

The present study explores the dramatic projection of one's own views onto those of Jesus among conservative and liberal American Christians. In a large-scale survey, the relevant views that each group attributed to a contemporary Jesus differed almost as much as their own views. Despite such dissonance-reducing projection, however, conservatives acknowledged the relevant discrepancy with regard to "fellowship" issues (e.