Data element investment strategy: How can leaders and followers innovate in dynamic market environments.

In the era of the digital economy, the data element investment strategy decisions and game mechanisms of leaders and followers are crucial issues to be studied. To explore the environment in which digital collaboration between enterprises benefits both parties, this study initially proposes a three-stage game model of leaders and followers based on the sequential game method. Subsequently, we analyze the investment strategy choices for leading and following enterprises across six scenarios within dynamic market environments.

Exploring pollution control in transboundary watersheds under the perspective of ecological compensation based on aggregate game.

Pollution control in inter-provincial river basins involves many complex subjects, so it is difficult to effectively implement ecological compensation policies. To clarify the interest relationship among pollution control subjects and stimulate their willingness to cooperate in collaborative governance, this paper builds a multi-agent coordinated pollution control model based on the theory of aggregate game; explores the change of equilibrium action of a single pollution control agent and multi-actors, symmetric, and asymmetric situations under the influence of synergistic benefits; and studies the incentive mechanism design to maintain the cooperation of various agents. The research results show that an increase in the number of upstream firms would lead to a reduction in the incentive effects of downstream government compensation and an increase in the likelihood of "free-riding" and "coordination failure.

A game theoretical model for the stimulation of public cooperation in environmental collaborative governance.

Digital technologies provide a convenient way for the public to participate in environmental governance. Therefore, by means of a two-stage evolutionary model, a new mechanism for promoting public cooperation is proposed to accomplish environmental collaborative governance. Interactive effects of government-enterprise environmental governance are firstly explored, which is the external atmosphere for public behaviour.

The Singaporean model in public goods dilemmas with benevolent leaders and bribery.

Public goods dilemmas are at the heart of some of the greatest challenges of our time, including climate inaction, growing inequality, and the overuse of natural resources. The public goods game in which cooperators contribute to a common pool that is then shared equally with defectors who contribute nothing captures the gist of the problem. Cooperators therefore cannot prevail, which ultimately leads to the tragedy of the commons.

Synergistic third-party rewarding and punishment in the public goods game.

We study the evolution of cooperation in the spatial public goods game in the presence of third-party rewarding and punishment. The third party executes public intervention, punishing groups where cooperation is weak and rewarding groups where cooperation is strong. We consider four different scenarios to determine what works best for cooperation, in particular, neither rewarding nor punishment, only rewarding, only punishment or both rewarding and punishment.

Dissimilarity-driven behavior and cooperation in the spatial public goods game.

In this paper, we explore the impact of four different types of dissimilarity-driven behavior on the evolution of cooperation in the spatial public goods game. While it is commonly assumed that individuals adapt their strategy by imitating one of their more successful neighbors, in reality only very few will be awarded the highest payoffs. Many have equity or equality preferences, and they have to make do with an average or even with a low payoff.