High-risk pooling for mitigating risk selection incentives in health insurance markets with sophisticated risk equalization: an application based on health survey information.

Background: Despite sophisticated risk equalization, insurers in regulated health insurance markets still face incentives to attract healthy people and avoid the chronically ill because of predictable differences in profitability between these groups. The traditional approach to mitigate such incentives for risk selection is to improve the risk-equalization model by adding or refining risk adjusters. However, not all potential risk adjusters are appropriate.

Predictable profits and losses in a health insurance market with risk equalization: A multiple-contract period perspective.

Many social health insurance systems rely on 'regulated competition' among insurers to improve efficiency. In the presence of community-rated premiums, risk equalization is an important regulatory feature to mitigate risk-selection incentives in such systems. Empirical studies evaluating selection incentives have typically quantified group-level (un)profitability for one contract period.

Selection Incentives in the Dutch Basic Health Insurance: To What Extent Does End-of-Life Spending Contribute to Predictable Profits and Losses for Selective Groups?

Existing risk-equalization models in individual health insurance markets with premium-rate restrictions do not completely compensate insurers for predictable profits/losses, confronting insurers with risk selection incentives. To guide further improvement of risk-equalization models, it is important to obtain insight into the drivers of remaining predictable profits/losses. This article studies a specific potential driver: end-of-life spending (defined here as spending in the last 1-5 years of life).

Incorporating self-reported health measures in risk equalization through constrained regression.

Most health insurance markets with premium-rate restrictions include a risk equalization system to compensate insurers for predictable variation in spending. Recent research has shown, however, that even the most sophisticated risk equalization systems tend to undercompensate (overcompensate) groups of people with poor (good) self-reported health, confronting insurers with incentives for risk selection. Self-reported health measures are generally considered infeasible for use as an explicit 'risk adjuster' in risk equalization models.

Examining unpriced risk heterogeneity in the Dutch health insurance market.

A major challenge in regulated health insurance markets is to mitigate risk selection potential. Risk selection can occur in the presence of unpriced risk heterogeneity, which refers to predictable variation in health care spending not reflected in either premiums by insurers or risk equalization payments. This paper examines unpriced risk heterogeneity within risk groups distinguished by the sophisticated Dutch risk equalization model of 2016.