Against Anti-Abortion Violence.

Jeremy Williams argues that both anti-abortion and pro-choice theories seem to justify two forms of anti-abortion violence - (1) violence against those that perform abortions, and (2) the subjugation of women seeking abortion. He illustrates this by way of his Death Camps analogy. However, Williams does not advocate such violence; rather he seems despondent over his conclusion.

Parthenogenesis, identity, and value.

Parthenogenesis is a form of asexual reproduction in which a gamete (ovum or sperm) develops without being fertilized. Tomer Jordi Chaffer uses parthenogenesis to challenge Don Marquis' future-like-ours (FLO) argument against abortion. According to Marquis, (1) what makes it morally wrong to kill us is that it would deprive us of a possible future that we might come to value-a future "like ours" (FLO) and (2) human fetuses are numerically identical to any adult human organism they may develop into, and thus have a FLO.

What's Wrong with Restrictivism?

Emily Carroll and Parker Crutchfield propose a new inconsistency argument against abortion restrictivism. In response, I raised several objections to their argument. Recently Carroll and Crutchfield have replied and seem to be under the impression that I'm a restrictivist.

Ectogenesis rescue case: a reply to Hendricks.

Hendricks set out to construct an antiabortion version of Jeff McMahan's Embryo Rescue case in which you have two choices-(1) save a woman from an unwilling pregnancy or (2) save a fetus from being killed. In his Pregnancy Rescue case, he contends we ought to choose (2), which he thinks shows abortion is immoral. However, I argue the Pregnancy Rescue case is a false dilemma because you can save both.

On Ageing and Maturing.

Räsänen draws a distinction between chronological age and biological age and argues that biological ageing is (sometimes) desirable. To demonstrate this, he asks us to consider the case of April, who like Karel Čapek's Elina Makropulos, has stopped biologically ageing. Unlike Makropulos, though, April's biological ageing was halted before puberty, so she will never mature into adulthood.

Three Problems with the Impairment Argument.

In his recent article "Even if the fetus is not a person, abortion is immoral: The Impairment Argument," Perry Hendricks sets out to sidestep thorny metaphysical questions regarding human fetuses and present a new argument against abortion - if impairing a fetus with fetal alcohol syndrome is immoral, then killing the fetus is immoral. Hendricks takes inspiration from Judith Jarvis Thomson's defense of abortion - that even if fetuses are persons with a right to life, the right to life is not the right to use others, so it is acceptable to induce abortion. Together with Bruce Blackshaw, Hendricks set out to strengthen the impairment argument by appealing to Don Marquis's future like ours (FLO) account of the wrongness of killing.

Deception in medicine: acupuncturist cases.

Colgrove challenges Doug Hardman's account of deception in medicine. Hardman contends physicians can unintentionally deceive their patients, illustrating this by way of an acupuncturist who believes what she says despite insufficient medical evidence, falling short of what Hardman believes adequate disclosure requires. Colgrove argues deception requires intent but constructs an alternative case in which an acupuncturist does not believe what he tells the patient, but purportedly lacks an intent to deceive.

Abortion, Rights, and Cabin Cases.

Many people believe the morality of abortion stands or falls on the moral status of the fetus, with abortion opponents arguing fetuses are persons with a right to life. Judith Jarvis Thomson bypasses this debate, arguing that even if we assume fetuses have a right to life, this is not a right to use other people's bodies. Recently Perry Hendricks attempts to bypass discussion of rights, assuming that if he can show that some people have a right to use other's bodies, then we ought to restrict abortion (and perhaps compel organ donation, charity, etc.

The Moral Significance of Abortion Inconsistency Arguments.

Most opponents of abortion (OA) believe fetuses . Critics argue that OA act inconsistently with regards to fetal life, seeking to restrict access to induced abortion, but largely ignoring spontaneous abortion and the creation of surplus embryos by IVF. Nicholas Colgrove, Bruce Blackshaw, and Daniel Rodger call such arguments and contend they do not They present three objections to these arguments - the other beliefs, other actions, and hypocrisy objection.

Public health, induced abortion, and spontaneous abortion.

Bruce P. Blackshaw and Daniel Rodger contend that if we assume fetuses are persons, then abortion is a public health crisis that justifies overriding a gestational mother's rights and compelling her to carry the fetus to term, but dawdle addressing greater public health crises like spontaneous abortion and hunger. They draw a distinction between deliberate and indeliberate harm to justify restricting rights in the former, but not the latter; but such distinction fails to justify restricting rights in most public health crises.

Mitochondrial Replacement Techniques, the Non-Identity Problem, and Genetic Parenthood.

Mitochondrial replacement techniques (MRTs) are designed to allow couples to have children without passing on mitochondrial diseases. Recently, Giulia Cavaliere and César Palacios-González argued that prospective parents have the right to use MRTs to pursue genetic relatedness, such that some same-sex couples and/or polygamous triads could use the process to impart genetic relatedness between a child and more of its caregivers. Although MRTs carry medical risks, Cavaliere and Palacios-González contend that because MRTs are identity-affecting, they do not cause harm to an existing human being, and our intuitions otherwise arise from the non-identity problem.

Genetic parenthood and hard cases.

In a recent article Thomas Douglas and Katrien Devolder propose a theory of genetic parenthood according to which a human child can have only two genetic human parents. I argue this theory is arbitrarily narrow and fails to account for cases such as hybrids, cloning, chimerism, twinning, parthenogenesis, mitochondrial replacement techniques, and more. I propose an alternate theory of genetic parenthood, one that is prima facie consistent with our commonsense intuitions about genetic parenthood and relevant to a right to procreative autonomy.

The inconsistency argument: why apparent pro-life inconsistency undermines opposition to induced abortion.

Most opposition to induced abortion turns on the belief that human fetuses are persons from conception. On this view, the moral status of the fetus requires those in a position to provide aid-gestational mothers-to make tremendous sacrifices to benefit the fetus. Recently, critics have argued that this pro-life position requires more than opposition to induced abortion.

On the impairment argument.

Most opposition to abortion stands or falls on whether a fetus is the sort of being whose life it is seriously wrong to end. In her influential paper 'A defense of abortion,' Judith Jarvis Thomson effectively sidesteps this issue, assuming the fetus is a person with the right to life yet arguing this alone does not give it the right to use the mother's body. In a recent article, Perry Hendricks takes inspiration from Thomson and assumes the fetus is not a person, arguing that abortion is wrong because causing fetal impairment is wrong and abortion is worse than causing fetal impairment.

The Cohen problem of informed consent.

To avoid potential abuse and respect patient autonomy, physicians have a moral obligation to obtain informed consent before performing any significant medical intervention. To give , a patient must be competent, understand her condition, options and their expected risks and benefits and must freely and expressly consent to one of those options. Shlomo Cohen challenges this conception of informed consent by constructing cases based on Edmund Gettier's classic counterexamples to traditional theories of knowledge.

Abortion and Ectogenesis: Moral Compromise.

The contemporary philosophical literature on abortion primarily revolves around three seemingly intractable debates, concerning the (1) moral status of the fetus, (2) scope of women's rights and (3) moral relevance of the killing/letting die distinction. The possibility of ectogenesis-technology that would allow a fetus to develop outside of a gestational mother's womb-presents a unique opportunity for moral compromise. Here, I argue those opposed to abortion have a moral obligation to pursue ectogenesis technology and provide ectogenesis for disconnected fetuses as part of a moral compromise.

Substance, rights, value, and abortion.

Most serious contemporary opposition to abortion is grounded on the belief that human fetuses are members of the same moral category as beings like us, and that the loss of any such life is one of the worst possible losses. Substance view theorists oppose abortion for this reason: in their view beings like us are essentially rational substances with inherent moral worth, and those who perform induced abortion fail to recognize this moral worth. In a recent series of articles, Rob Lovering presents reductio-style arguments against the substance view, in part arguing that it is inconsistent with our intuitions in rescue and spontaneous abortion cases.

On legal age change.

Joona Räsänen argues some people have a right to change their legal age to prevent age discrimination. He proposes two prerequisites-the person feels his age differs from his legal age, and that person's biological age differs from his chronological age. I argue we can achieve the same protections from ageism through restricting access to one's birth date.

Two Tragedies Argument: Two Mistakes.

Most opposition to abortion turns on the claim that human fetuses are full moral agents from conception (or soon afterwards). Critics argue that antiabortion theorists act hypocritically when they neglect spontaneous abortions-valuing some fetal lives and not others. Many philosophers draw a distinction between killing and letting die, with the former being morally impermissible and latter acceptable.

The Two tragedies argument.

Opposition to induced abortion rests on the belief that fetuses have a moral status comparable to beings like us, and that the loss of such a life is tragic. Antiabortion, or pro-life, theorists argue that (1) it is wrong to induce abortion and (2) it is wrong to allow others to perform induced abortion. However, evidence suggests that spontaneous abortion kills far more fetuses than induced abortion, and critics argue that most pro-life theorists neglect the threat of spontaneous abortion and ought to do more to prevent it.

Informed consent and nudging.

In order to avoid patient abuse, under normal situations before performing a medical intervention on a patient, a physician must obtain informed consent from that patient, where to give genuine informed consent a patient must be competent, understand her condition, her options and their expected risks and benefits, and must expressly consent to one of those options. However, many patients refrain from the option that their physician believes to be best, and many physicians worry that their patients make irrational healthcare decisions, hindering their ability to provide efficient healthcare for their patients. Some philosophers have proposed a solution to this problem: they advocate that physicians nudge their patients to steer them towards their physician's preferred option.

The parenthood argument.

Don Marquis is well known for his future like ours theory (FLO), according to which the killing beings like us is seriously morally wrong because it deprives us of a future we can value. According to Marquis, human fetuses possess a future they can come to value, and thus according to FLO have a right to life. Recently Mark Brown has argued that even if FLO shows fetuses have a right to life, it fails to show that fetuses have a right to use their mother's body, evoking Judith Jarvis Thomson's famous violinist case.

Nudging, informed consent and bullshit.

Some philosophers have argued that during the process of obtaining informed consent, physicians should try to nudge their patients towards consenting to the option the physician believes best, where a is any influence that is expected to predictably alter a person's behaviour without (substantively) restricting her options. Some proponents of nudging even argue that it is a necessary and unavoidable part of securing informed consent. Here I argue that nudging is incompatible with obtaining informed consent.