Psilocybin: The most effective moral bio-enhancer?

This paper addresses the possible effects of psychedelic drugs, notably psilocybin, on moral bio-enhancement (MBE). It will be argued that non-psychedelic substances, such as oxytocin, serotonin/serotonin reuptake inhibitors, or vasopressin, have indirect effects on M(B)E, whereas psilocybin has direct effects. Additionally, morality and happiness have been shown to operate in a circularly supportive relationship.

What drives public attitudes towards moral bioenhancement and why it matters: an exploratory study.

The paper represents an empirical study of public attitudes towards moral bioenhancement. Moral bioenhancement implies the improvement of moral dispositions, i.e.

European Electronic Personal Health Records initiatives and vulnerable migrants: A need for greater ethical, legal and social safeguards.

The effective collection and management of personal data of rapidly migrating populations is important for ensuring adequate healthcare and monitoring of a displaced peoples' health status. With developments in ICT data sharing capabilities, electronic personal health records (ePHRs) are increasingly replacing less transportable paper records. ePHRs offer further advantages of improving accuracy and completeness of information and seem tailored for rapidly displaced and mobile populations.

Genome Editing for Involuntary Moral Enhancement.

During the previous years, voluntary moral bioenhancement (VMBE) has been contrasted to compulsory moral bioenhancement (CMBE). In this paper a third possible type of moral bioenhancement is discussed: genome editing for moral enhancement of the unborn that is neither voluntary nor compulsory, but involuntary. Involuntary moral bioenhancement (IMBE) might engineer people who will be more moral than they otherwise would have been.

Gender Dysphoria: Bioethical Aspects of Medical Treatment.

Gender affirmation surgery remains one of the greatest challenges in transgender medicine. In recent years, there have been continuous discussions on bioethical aspects in the treatment of persons with gender dysphoria. Gender reassignment is a difficult process, including not only hormonal treatment with possible surgery but also social discrimination and stigma.

Different games of moral bioenhancement.

Rakić has serious misgivings about Wiseman's inability to frame ethical issues in the context of transcending existing realities (the 'is') with the aim of achieving what we believe is morally right (the 'ought'). This inability to think beyond the present is misguided in ethics. He also criticizes Wiseman for making the unimaginative and unsubstantiated assumption that moral bioenhancement (MBE) technologies have reached their zenith already.

Incentivized goodness.

It will be argued that humans have a rational self-interest in voluntarily opting to subject themselves to moral bioenhancement. This interest is based on the fact that goodness appears to be conducive to happiness. Those who understand that will be more inclined to opt for safe and effective moral bioenhancement technologies that have the potential to augment our motivation to become better.

The Issues of Freedom and Happiness in Moral Bioenhancement: Continuing the Debate With a Reply to Harris Wiseman.

During the previous years, Harris Wiseman has devoted substantial attention to my stance on voluntary moral bioenhancement. He argued that he has been influenced by that position, but nonetheless criticized it. I haven't replied to his criticisms yet and wish to do so now.

Ethical sharing of health data in online platforms - which values should be considered?

Intensified and extensive data production and data storage are characteristics of contemporary western societies. Health data sharing is increasing with the growth of Information and Communication Technology (ICT) platforms devoted to the collection of personal health and genomic data. However, the sensitive and personal nature of health data poses ethical challenges when data is disclosed and shared even if for scientific research purposes.

Moral Bioenhancement and Free Will: Continuing the Debate.

This article continues and expands differences I have with Ingmar Persson and Julian Savulescu concerning issues of moral bioenhancement and free will. They have criticized my conception of voluntary moral bioenhancement, claiming that it ignores the extent to which freedom is a matter of degree. Here, I argue that freedom as a political concept (or as one that is analogous to a political concept) is indeed scalar in nature, but that freedom of the will is to be understood as a threshold concept and therefore not as subject to degree.

Compulsory administration of oxytocin does not result in genuine moral enhancement.

The question will be raised whether oxytocin can serve as an effective moral enhancer. Different types of moral enhancement will be addressed, one of them being compulsory moral enhancement. It will be argued that oxytocin cannot serve as an effective moral enhancer if its use is being made compulsory.

"You hoped we would sleep walk into accepting the collection of our data": controversies surrounding the UK care.data scheme and their wider relevance for biomedical research.

An 'Information Centre' has recently been established by law which has the power to collect, collate and provide access to the medical information for all patients treated by the National Health Service in England, whether in hospitals or by General Practitioners. This so-called 'care.data' scheme has given rise to major and ongoing controversies.

We must create beings with moral standing superior to our own.

Several lines of reasoning have been employed to both approve and disapprove two of Nicholas Agar's positions: his argument that the creation of postpersons (based on moral status enhancement) is imaginable and possible and his inductive argument disfavoring the creation of postpersons. This article discusses a number of these lines of reasoning, arguing that 1) The creation of postpersons is imaginable if they are envisaged as morally enhanced beings. 2) The creation of postpersons is justified, subject to the condition that we create morally enhanced postpersons.

Voluntary moral enhancement and the survival-at-any-cost bias.

I discuss the argument of Persson and Savulescu that moral enhancement ought to accompany cognitive enhancement, as well as briefly addressing critiques of this argument, notably by John Harris. I argue that Harris, who believes that cognitive enhancement is largely sufficient for making us behave more morally, might be disposing too easily of the great quandary of our moral existence: the gap between what we do and what we believe is morally right to do. In that regard, Persson and Savulescu's position has the potential to offer more.

Bioethics in Serbia: institutions in need of philosophical debate.

This paper is structured in three sections. The first discusses the institutional framework pertaining to bioethics in Serbia. The functioning of this framework is critically assessed and a number of recommendations for its improvement presented.