Background: Haliburton, Kawartha, Pine Ridge District Health Unit (HKPRDHU) investigated an exposure in an Ontario operatory dental facility related to a newly diagnosed hepatitis C virus (HCV) infection caused by a virus with an uncommon hepatitis C genotype. Lapses in Infection Prevention and Control (IPAC) and a second epidemiologically-linked case (with the same uncommon hepatitis C genotype) were identified, prompting a broader public health response and outbreak investigation.
Objectives: a) To describe the investigation of a newly diagnosed case of hepatitis C; b) to describe the broader public health response, and c) to address a paucity in the literature related to the risk of disease transmission in dental settings due to IPAC lapses.
Eliminating Cryptosporidium oocysts is particularly challenging in prison environments, and limited information is available on best practices for outbreak control. This report aims to expand the evidence base through the lessons learned from an outbreak at a Canadian federal penitentiary in 2013. The outbreak investigation methods included inmate and staff case finding, hypothesis-generating questionnaires, and environmental investigation.
View Article and Find Full Text PDFIn July 2015, a cluster of five suspect cases of clinically diagnosed Mycobacterium marinum (M. marinum) skin infections were reported to the Haliburton, Kawartha, Pine Ridge District Health Unit (HKPRDHU), Ontario, Canada, with two additional cases subsequently identified through case finding. All seven cases presented with cutaneous lesions located on the finger, hand and/or elbow regions typical of M.
View Article and Find Full Text PDFIn March 2008, an enteric outbreak was reported from a correctional facility in Central East Ontario to the Haliburton, Kawartha, Pine Ridge District Health Unit. The clinical and epidemiological data were compatible with the presence of norovirus in this enteric outbreak. This report summarizes the outbreak investigation conducted and the various public health measures undertaken through a coordinated response by the facility health care and correctional staff and local and provincial health authorities to contain the infection within the facility.
View Article and Find Full Text PDFBackground: Understanding transmission dynamics of the pandemic influenza A (H1N1) virus in various exposure settings and determining whether transmissibility differed from seasonal influenza viruses was a priority for decision making on mitigation strategies at the beginning of the pandemic. The objective of this study was to estimate household secondary attack rates for pandemic influenza in a susceptible population where control measures had yet to be implemented.
Methods: All Ontario local health units were invited to participate; seven health units volunteered.