Evolutionary game dynamics in a finite asymmetric two-deme population and emergence of cooperation.

We consider evolutionary game dynamics in a finite population subdivided into two demes with both unequal deme sizes and different migration rates. Assuming viability differences in the population according to a linear game within each deme as a result of pairwise interactions, we specify conditions for weak selection favoring a mutant strategy to go to fixation, under the structured-coalescent assumptions, and their connections with evolutionary stability concepts. In the framework of the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma with strategy 'tit-for-tat' as mutant strategy and 'always defect' as resident strategy, we deduce a condition under which the emergence of cooperation is favored by selection, when the game matrix is the same in both demes.

Fixation probability for a beneficial allele and a mutant strategy in a linear game under weak selection in a finite island model.

The effect of population structure on the probability of fixation of a newly introduced mutant under weak selection is studied using a coalescent approach. Wright's island model in a framework of a finite number of demes is assumed and two selection regimes are considered: a beneficial allele model and a linear game among offspring. A first-order approximation of the fixation probability for a single mutant with respect to the intensity of selection is deduced.

The probability of fixation of a single mutant in an exchangeable selection model.

The Cannings exchangeable model for a finite population in discrete time is extended to incorporate selection. The probability of fixation of a mutant type is studied under the assumption of weak selection. An exact formula for the derivative of this probability with respect to the intensity of selection is deduced, and developed in the case of a single mutant.