The Prisoner's Dilemma paradigm provides a neurobiological framework for the social decision cascade.

To function during social interactions, we must be able to consider and coordinate our actions with other people's perspectives. This process unfolds from decision-making, to anticipation of that decision's consequences, to feedback about those consequences, in what can be described as a "cascade" of three phases. The iterated Prisoner's Dilemma (iPD) task, an economic-exchange game used to illustrate how people achieve stable cooperation over repeated interactions, provides a framework for examining this "social decision cascade".

Social Feedback Modulates Neural Response Associated With Cognitive Bias in Individuals Expressing Anxious Symptoms.

Background: Social anxiety is characterized by a tendency to overestimate the likelihood of negative outcomes and consequences before, during, and after interpersonal interactions with social partners. Recent evidence suggests that a network of brain regions critical for perspective-taking, threat appraisal, and uncertainty resolution may function atypically in those prone to social anxiety. In this study, we used functional magnetic resonance imaging to examine neural activity in specific regions of interest in a sample of young adults who endorsed high or low levels of social anxiety.

Selfless giving.

In four studies, we show that people who anticipate more personal change over time give more to others. We measure and manipulate participants' beliefs in the persistence of the defining psychological features of a person (e.g.

The effect of analytic and experiential modes of thought on moral judgment.

According to dual-process theories, moral judgments are the result of two competing processes: a fast, automatic, affect-driven process and a slow, deliberative, reason-based process. Accordingly, these models make clear and testable predictions about the influence of each system. Although a small number of studies have attempted to examine each process independently in the context of moral judgment, no study has yet tried to experimentally manipulate both processes within a single study.

Toward an integrated neuroscience of morality: the contribution of neuroeconomics to moral cognition.

Interest in the neural processes underlying decision making has led to a flurry of recent research in the fields of both moral psychology and neuroeconomics. In this paper, we first review some important findings from both disciplines, and then argue that the two fields can mutually benefit each other. A more explicit recognition of the role of values and norms will likely lead to more accurate models of decision making for neuroeconomists, whereas the tasks, insights into neural mechanisms, and mathematical modeling common in neuroeconomic research offer moral psychologists the opportunity to expand their field and move beyond methodological limitations that may have hindered the field's progress to this point.

Temperament and intuition: a commentary on Feltz and Cokely.

In this paper, we examine Adam Feltz and Edward Cokely's recent claim that "the personality trait extraversion predicts people's intuitions about the relationship of determinism to free will and moral responsibility" (INSERT REFERENCE). We will first present some criticisms of their work before briefly examining the results of a recent study of our own. We argue that while Feltz and Cokely have their finger on the pulse of an interesting and important issue, they have not established a robust and stable connection between extraversion and compatibilist-friendly intuitions.