Evolutionary games on multilayer networks: coordination and equilibrium selection.

We study mechanisms of synchronisation, coordination, and equilibrium selection in two-player coordination games on multilayer networks. We investigate three possible update rules: the replicator dynamics (RD), the best response (BR), and the unconditional imitation (UI). Players interact on a two-layer random regular network.

Coordination and equilibrium selection in games: the role of local effects.

We study the role of local effects and finite size effects in reaching coordination and in equilibrium selection in two-player coordination games. We investigate three update rules - the replicator dynamics (RD), the best response (BR), and the unconditional imitation (UI). For the pure coordination game with two equivalent strategies we find a transition from a disordered state to coordination for a critical value of connectivity.

Predicting language diversity with complex networks.

We analyze the model of social interactions with coevolution of the topology and states of the nodes. This model can be interpreted as a model of language change. We propose different rewiring mechanisms and perform numerical simulations for each.