The role of information about "convention," "design," and "goal" in representing artificial kinds.

In this chapter, we have considered the nature and development of our capacities for the representation of artificial kinds. We have presented a range of evidence collected using varying methods and from our own laboratories and those of others that speaks to the question of the kinds of information that might be central to knowledge of artifacts and their functions in human semantic memory. One key argument here has been that despite the fact that information about shared convention has been argued to play an important role in understanding of the "proper" uses of artifacts, just as it does in the case of the use of linguistic symbols within language communities, there are important differences between the two cases, and indeed across development, decisions about categories and functions dissociate.

Conditions under which function information attenuates name extension via shape.

Children often extend names to novel artifacts on the basis of overall shape rather than core properties (e.g., function).

Representational and executive selection resources in 'theory of mind': evidence from compromised belief-desire reasoning in old age.

Effective belief-desire reasoning requires both specialized representational capacities-the capacity to represent the mental states as such-as well as executive selection processes for accurate performance on tasks requiring the prediction and explanation of the actions of social agents. Compromised belief-desire reasoning in a given population may reflect failures in either or both of these systems. We report evidence supporting this two-process model from belief-desire reasoning tasks conducted with younger and older adult populations.

Competence and performance in belief-desire reasoning across two cultures: the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth about false belief?

There is a change in false belief task performance across the 3-5 year age range, as confirmed in a recent meta-analysis [Wellman, H. M., Cross, D.

Neural correlates of detecting pretense: automatic engagement of the intentional stance under covert conditions.

Typically developing children begin to produce and understand pretend play between 18 and 24 months of age, and early pretense has been argued to be a candidate ''core'' capacity central to the deployment of representations of other peoples' mental states-''theory of mind.'' In a functional magnetic resonance imaging study, 16 healthy adult volunteers were imaged while watching short (5 sec) clips of actors who either performed simple everyday actions or pretended to perform a similar set of actions, under covert conditions (e. g.

Functional fixedness in a technologically sparse culture.

Problem solving can be inefficient when the solution requires subjects to generate an atypical function for an object and the object's typical function has been primed. Subjects become "fixed" on the design function of the object, and problem solving suffers relative to control conditions in which the object's function is not demonstrated. In the current study, such functional fixedness was demonstrated in a sample of adolescents (mean age of 16 years) among the Shuar of Ecuadorian Amazonia, whose technologically sparse culture provides limited access to large numbers of artifacts with highly specialized functions.

Belief-desire reasoning as a process of selection.

Human learning may depend upon domain specialized mechanisms. A plausible example is rapid, early learning about the thoughts and feelings of other people. A major achievement in this domain, at about age four in the typically developing child, is the ability to solve problems in which the child attributes false beliefs to other people and predicts their actions.

Core mechanisms in "theory of mind".

Our ability to understand the thoughts and feelings of other people does not initially develop as a theory but as a mechanism. The "theory of mind" mechanism (ToMM) is part of the core architecture of the human brain, and is specialized for learning about mental states. Impaired development of this mechanism can have drastic effects on social learning, seen most strikingly in the autistic spectrum disorders.

Acquiring an understanding of design: evidence from children's insight problem solving.

The human ability to make tools and use them to solve problems may not be zoologically unique, but it is certainly extraordinary. Yet little is known about the conceptual machinery that makes humans so competent at making and using tools. Do adults and children have concepts specialized for understanding human-made artifacts? If so, are these concepts deployed in attempts to solve novel problems? Here we present new data, derived from problem-solving experiments, which support the following.