ODEbase: a repository of ODE systems for systems biology.

Summary: Recently, symbolic computation and computer algebra systems have been successfully applied in systems biology, especially in chemical reaction network theory. One advantage of symbolic computation is its potential for qualitative answers to biological questions. Qualitative methods analyze dynamical input systems as formal objects, in contrast to investigating only part of the state space, as is the case with numerical simulation.

Consciousness regained? Philosophical arguments for and against reductive physicalism.

This paper is an overview of recent discussions concerning the mind-body problem, which is being addressed at the interface between philosophy and neuroscience. It focuses on phenomenal features of consciousness or "qualia," which are distinguished from various related issues. Then follows a discussion of various influential skeptical arguments that question the possibility of reductive explanations of qualia in physicalist terms: knowledge arguments, conceivability arguments, the argument of multiple realizability, and the explanatory gap argument.

Bühler and Popper: Kantian therapies for the crisis in psychology.

I analyze the historical background and philosophical considerations of Karl Bühler and his student Karl Popper regarding the crisis of psychology. They share certain Kantian questions and methods for reflection on the state of the art in psychology. Part 1 outlines Bühler's diagnosis and therapy for the crisis in psychology as he perceived it, leading to his famous theory of language.

Crisis discussions in psychology--New historical and philosophical perspectives.

In this introductory article, we provide a historical and philosophical framework for studying crisis discussions in psychology. We first trace the various meanings of crisis talk outside and inside of the sciences. We then turn to Kuhn's concept of crisis, which is mainly an analyst's category referring to severe clashes between theory and data.

Algorithmic global criteria for excluding oscillations.

We investigate algorithmic methods to tackle the following problem: Given a system of parametric ordinary differential equations built by a biological model, does there exist ranges of values for the model parameters and variables which are both meaningful from a biological point of view and where oscillating trajectories, can be found? We show that in the common case of polynomial vector fields known criteria excluding the existence of non-constant limit cycles lead to quantifier elimination problems over the reals.We apply these criteria to various models that have been previously investigated in the context of algebraic biology.

Kant and the scientific study of consciousness.

We argue that Kant's views about consciousness, the mind-body problem and the status of psychology as a science all differ drastically from the way in which these topics are conjoined in present debates about the prominent idea of a science of consciousness. Kant never used the concept of consciousness in the now dominant sense of phenomenal qualia; his discussions of the mind-body problem center not on the reducibility of mental properties but of substances; and his views about the possibility of psychology as a science did not employ the requirement of a mechanistic explanation, but of a quantification of phenomena. This shows strikingly how deeply philosophical problems and conceptions can change even if they look similar on the surface.

Why did Kant reject physiological explanations in his anthropology?

One of Kant's central tenets concerning the human sciences is the claim that one need not, and should not, use a physiological vocabulary if one studies human cognitions, feelings, desires, and actions from the point of view of his 'pragmatic' anthropology. The claim is well known, but the arguments Kant advances for it have not been closely discussed. I argue against misguided interpretations of the claim, and I present his actual reasons in favor of it.

Is there a problem with mathematical psychology in the eighteenth century? A fresh look at Kant's old argument.

Common opinion ascribes to Immanuel Kant the view that psychology cannot become a science properly so called, because it cannot be mathematized. It is equally common to claim that this reflects the state of the art of his times; that the quantification of the mind was not achieved during the eighteenth century, while it was so during the nineteenth century; or that Kant's so-called "impossibility claim" was refuted by nineteenth-century developments, which in turn opened one path for psychology to become properly scientific. These opinions are often connected, but they are misguided nevertheless.

Roles of instruments in psychological research.

What roles have instruments played in psychology and related disciplines? How have instruments affected the dynamics of psychological research, with what possibilities and limits? What is the psychological instrument? This article provides a conceptual foundation for specific case studies concerning such questions. The discussion begins by challenging widely accepted assumptions about the subject and analyzing the general relations between scientific experimentation and the uses of instruments in psychology. Building on this analysis, a deliberately inclusive definition of what constitutes a psychological instrument is proposed.