AI, doping and ethics: On why increasing the effectiveness of detecting doping fraud in sport may be morally wrong.

In this article, our aim is to show why increasing the effectiveness of detecting doping fraud in sport by the use of artificial intelligence (AI) may be morally wrong. The first argument in favour of this conclusion is that using AI to make a non-ideal antidoping policy even more effective can be morally wrong. Whether the increased effectiveness is morally wrong depends on whether you believe that the current antidoping system administrated by the World Anti-Doping Agency is already morally wrong.

Critique of autonomy-based arguments against legalising assisted dying.

The aim of this article is to present and critically investigate a type of argument against legalising assisted dying on request (ADR) for patients who are terminally ill and experiencing suffering. This type of argument has several variants. These-which we call 'autonomy-based arguments' against legalising ADR-invoke different specifications of the premise that we ought not to respect requests for assistance in dying made by terminally ill and suffering patients because the basic conditions of autonomy cannot be met in scenarios where such requests are made.

Leveling (down) the playing field: performance diminishments and fairness in sport.

The 2018 eligibility regulation for female competitors with differences of sexual development (DSD) issued by World Athletics requires competitors with DSD with blood testosterone levels at or above 5 nmol/L and sufficient androgen sensitivity to be excluded from competition in certain events unless they reduce the level of testosterone in their blood. This paper formalises and then critically assesses the fairness-based argument offered in support of this regulation by the federation. It argues that it is unclear how the biological advantage singled out by the regulation as an appropriate target for diminishment, is relevantly different from other biological advantages that athletes may enjoy, and specifically that Sigmund Loland's recent attempt to drive a wedge between heightened levels of blood testosterone and other biological advantages fails.

Company-sponsored egg freezing: an offer you can't refuse?

The aim of this article is to argue that one of the central arguments against company-sponsored non-medical egg freezing, namely that this practice is contrary to the reproductive autonomy of women, can be difficult to sustain under certain conditions. More specifically, we argue that company-sponsored egg freezing is not necessarily in conflict with the most common requirements for autonomous choice. That is, there is no reason to assume that employees cannot be adequately informed beforehand about what is scientifically known about the practice, and/or that they lack the required capacity to understand and process this information.

Doping, fairness, and unequal responsiveness: A response to Lavazza.

In a thought-provoking article in Bioethics, Andrea Lavazza defends the view that for reasons of fairness, those who cannot benefit from the use of performance-enhancing methods such as transcranial direct current stimulation (tDCS) should receive compensation for their inability. First, we argue that Lavazza's proposal to compensate athletes who are non-responsive to tDCS is practically unfeasible. Second, the compensation principle-which he appeals to in his defense of his compensation scheme-is false, as it is incoherent to focus only on the compensation of athletes who respond less well to tDCS, and not to compensate athletes who respond less well to all other types of enhancers such as mental training and food supplements.

Arguments on thin ice: on non-medical egg freezing and individualisation arguments.

The aim of this article is to provide a systematic reconstruction and critique of what is taken to be a central ethical concern against the use of non-medical egg freezing (NMEF). The concern can be captured in what we can call the individualisation argument. The argument states, very roughly, that women should not use NMEF as it is an individualistic and morally problematic solution to the social problems that women face, for instance, in the labour market.

Age change, official age and fairness in health.

In a recent JME article, Joona Räsänen makes the case for allowing legal age change. We identify three problems with his argument and, on that basis, propose an improved version thereof. Unfortunately, even the improved argument is vulnerable to the objection that chronological age is a better proxy for justice in health than both legal and what we shall call official age.

Should neurotechnological treatments offered to offenders always be in their best interests?

The paper critically discusses the moral view that neurotechnological behavioural treatment for criminal offenders should only be offered if it is in their best interests. First, I show that it is difficult to apply and assess the notion of the offender's best interests unless one has a clear idea of what 'best interests' means. Second, I argue that if one accepts that harmful punishment of offenders has a place in the criminal justice system, it seems inconsistent not to accept the practice of offering offenders treatment even when the state will harm them in applying the treatment.

Should violent offenders be forced to undergo neurotechnological treatment? A critical discussion of the 'freedom of thought' objection.

In this paper we examine one reason for rejecting the view that violent offenders should be forced to undergo neurotechnological treatments (NTs) involving such therapies as psychoactive medication to curb violent behaviour. The reason is based on the concern that forced treatment violates the offender's right to freedom of thought. We argue that this objection can be challenged.

On the partiality of procreative beneficence: a critical note.

The aim of this paper is to criticise the well-discussed principle of Procreative Beneficence (PB) lately refined by Julian Savulescu and Guy Kahane. First, it is argued that advocates of PB leave us with an implausible justification for the moral partiality towards the child (or children) which reproducers decide to bring into existence as compared with all other individuals. This is implausible because the reasons given in favour of the partiality of PB, which are based on practical reason and common-sense morality, can just as well be used to guide reproducers to make choices that do not support partiality towards one's possible children.

Ethics, organ donation and tax: a reply to Quigley and Taylor.

A national opt-out system of post-mortem donation of scarce organs is preferable to an opt-in system. Unfortunately, the former system is not always feasible, and so in a recent JME article we canvassed the possibility of offering people a tax break for opting-in as a way of increasing the number of organs available for donation under an opt-in regime. Muireann Quigley and James Stacey Taylor criticize our proposal.

A woman's choice? On women, assisted reproduction and social coercion.

This paper critically discusses an argument that is sometimes pressed into service in the ethical debate about the use of assisted reproduction. The argument runs roughly as follows: we should prevent women from using assisted reproduction techniques, because women who want to use the technology have been socially coerced into desiring children--and indeed have thereby been harmed by the patriarchal society in which they live. I call this the argument from coercion.

The claim from adoption.

In this article several justifications of what I call 'the claim from adoption' are examined. The claim from adoption is that, instead of expending resources on bringing new children into the world using reproductive technology and then caring for these children, we ought to devote these resources to the adoption and care of existing destitute children. Arguments trading on the idea that resources should be directed to adoption instead of assisted reproduction because already existing people can benefit from such a use of resources whereas we cannot benefit individuals by bringing them into existence are rejected.