Impacts of future nuclear power generation on the international monitoring system.

Many countries are considering nuclear power as a means of reducing greenhouse gas emissions, and the IAEA (IAEA, 2022) has forecasted nuclear power growth rates up to 224% of the 2021 level by 2050. Nuclear power plants release trace quantities of radioxenon, an inert gas that is also monitored because it is released during nuclear explosive tests. To better understand how nuclear energy growth (and resulting Xe emissions) could affect a global nonproliferation architecture, we modeled daily releases of radioxenon isotopes used for nuclear explosion detection in the International Monitoring System (IMS) that is part of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty: Xe, Xe, Xe, and Xe to examine the change in the number of potential radioxenon detections as compared to the 2021 detection levels.

Using STAX data to predict IMS radioxenon concentrations.

The noble gas collection and measurement stations in the International Monitoring System (IMS) are heavily influenced by releases from medical isotope production facilities. The ability to reliably model the movement of radioxenon from the points of release to these IMS samplers has improved enough that a routine aspect of the analysis of IMS radioxenon data should be the prediction of the effect of releases from industrial nuclear facilities on the sample concentrations. Predicted concentrations at IMS noble gas systems in Germany and Sweden based on measured releases from Institute for Radioelements (IRE) in Belgium and atmospheric transport modeling for a four-month period are presented and discussed.

Comparison of near-background concentrations of Argon-37 and Xenon-133 in the atmosphere.

Radioisotopes of the noble gases xenon and argon can be important indicators of underground nuclear explosions. The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) includes monitoring capabilities to identify potential nuclear explosions conducted in violation of the CTBT. This monitoring currently focuses on measurement of the xenon isotopes Xe, Xe, Xe, and Xe.

The 2014 Integrated Field Exercise of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty revisited: The case for data fusion.

The International Monitoring System of the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO) uses a global network of radionuclide monitoring stations to detect evidence of a nuclear explosion. The two radionuclide technologies employed-particulate and noble gas (radioxenon) detection-have applications for data fusion to improve detection of a nuclear explosion. Using the hypothetical 0.

International challenge to model the long-range transport of radioxenon released from medical isotope production to six Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty monitoring stations.

After performing a first multi-model exercise in 2015 a comprehensive and technically more demanding atmospheric transport modelling challenge was organized in 2016. Release data were provided by the Australian Nuclear Science and Technology Organization radiopharmaceutical facility in Sydney (Australia) for a one month period. Measured samples for the same time frame were gathered from six International Monitoring System stations in the Southern Hemisphere with distances to the source ranging between 680 (Melbourne) and about 17,000 km (Tristan da Cunha).

Improved performance comparisons of radioxenon systems for low level releases in nuclear explosion monitoring.

The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty bans all nuclear tests and mandates development of verification measures to detect treaty violations. One verification measure is detection of radioactive xenon isotopes produced in the fission of actinides. The International Monitoring System (IMS) currently deploys automated radioxenon systems that can detect four radioxenon isotopes.

Abatement of xenon and iodine emissions from medical isotope production facilities.

The capability of the International Monitoring System (IMS) to detect xenon from underground nuclear explosions is dependent on the radioactive xenon background. Adding to the background, medical isotope production (MIP) by fission releases several important xenon isotopes including xenon-133 and iodine-133 that decays to xenon-133. The amount of xenon released from these facilities may be equivalent to or exceed that released from an underground nuclear explosion.

Maximum reasonable radioxenon releases from medical isotope production facilities and their effect on monitoring nuclear explosions.

Fission gases such as (133)Xe are used extensively for monitoring the world for signs of nuclear testing in systems such as the International Monitoring System (IMS). These gases are also produced by nuclear reactors and by fission production of (99)Mo for medical use. Recently, medical isotope production facilities have been identified as the major contributor to the background of radioactive xenon isotopes (radioxenon) in the atmosphere (Stocki et al.

Isotopic noble gas signatures released from medical isotope production facilities--simulations and measurements.

Radioxenon isotopes play a major role in confirming whether or not an underground explosion was nuclear in nature. It is then of key importance to understand the sources of environmental radioxenon to be able to distinguish civil sources from those of a nuclear explosion. Based on several years of measurements, combined with advanced atmospheric transport model results, it was recently shown that the main source of radioxenon observations are strong and regular batch releases from a very limited number of medical isotope production facilities.